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ABSTRACT 
Today, software is integrated into nearly every aspect of our lives and so are its 
vulnerabilities. Exploited software vulnerabilities can have detrimental financial, social, 
and economic effects. Researchers rely on Vulnerability Analysis Tools and Techniques 
(VATT) to amplify the vulnerability analysis process. There are hundreds of VATTs on 
the market, but there is no way to compare their relative efficacy. We developed a 
framework for the Benchmark for Vulnerability Analysis Tools and Techniques 
(BVATT). In addition to providing key metrics for quantifying the performance of a 
particular VATT, the proposed framework ensures that BVATT will facilitate the 
comparison of different VATTs in a manner that is repeatable, reproducible, fair, 
verifiable, and relevant. 
Additionally, in the past decade, there has been a noteworthy increase of 
VATTs that leverage machine-learning and data-mining techniques to identify 
vulnerabilities. Yet, there is no open-source tool to synthesize the extraction, 
cleaning, and transformation of common features from binary files to be 
compatible with these techniques. We develop such a tool, and call it BiSECT (Binary 
Synthesized Extraction, Cleaning, and Transformation). BiSECT reduces the barrier to 
entry and makes binary vulnerability analysis using data mining and machine 
learning more accessible to researchers. 
v 




1.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Background 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Vulnerability Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Existing Methods to Compare VATTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.5 Feature Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 A Framework for the Benchmark for Vulnerability Analysis Tools and Tech-
niques (BVATT) 51
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 BVATT Scoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 BVATT Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4 BiSECT: Binary Synthesized Extraction, Cleaning, and Transformation 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Feature Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 Data Cleaning and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5 BiSECT to Support At-Scale Vulnerability Identification in Binaries . . . . 118
4.6 BiSECT to Perform Test Suite Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
vii
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5 Conclusion 155
5.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.2 Ongoing and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
List of References 161
Initial Distribution List 189
viii
List of Figures
Figure 2.1 Grace Hopper log book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 2.2 Hierarchy of artificial intelligence machines . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 2.3 Organization of a perceptron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 2.4 Granularity of work reviewed in Gha arian and Shahriari 2017 survey 32
Figure 2.5 Treemap of predictors used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 2.6 Vulnerability Prediction Model (VPM) Pipeline. . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 2.7 Example of a vulnerability identification approach using anomaly
detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 2.8 Granularity of work reviewed in Lin et al. survey. . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 3.1 Example scorecard for a VATT run against Benchmark for Vulnera-
bility Analysis Tools and Techniques (BVATT) . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 3.2 Sample test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 3.3 Paired T-test for identical repeated measures . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 3.4 Paired T-test for di erent repeated measures . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 3.5 High level process to label functions in compiled code as vulnerable
or not vulnerable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 3.6 Sum of Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) (all statuses)
by year since 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 3.7 The high-level process to crawl, extract, manipulate, and visualize
CVE and Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) data . . . . . 69
Figure 3.8 CWE view 1000 depicted as a hierarchical radial dendrogram . . 70
Figure 3.9 Sum of vulnerability instances (CVE) by type (CWE) from 2014-2019 71
ix
Figure 3.10 Sunburst diagram comparison of CWE distribution in open source
datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Figure 3.11 High level workflow depicting sample design choice . . . . . . . 73
Figure 4.1 Average cost of a data breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure 4.2 The complete high-level workflow for BiSECT . . . . . . . . . . 91
Figure 4.3 BiSECT Feature extraction component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Figure 4.4 Treemap of most commonly used predictors . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 4.5 Objects, features, and feature vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Figure 4.6 Control flow graph (CFG) for Fibonacci example code . . . . . . 100
Figure 4.7 Assembly vs. C-Code Fibonacci example snippet . . . . . . . . . 102
Figure 4.8 Total function count by CWE Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Figure 4.9 Total function count by cyclomatic complexity . . . . . . . . . . 104
Figure 4.10 First 20 2,3,4-grams from the full Fibonacci.c example . . . . . . 107
Figure 4.11 Count of #-grams in 47K samples by associated CWE Pillar . . . 108
Figure 4.12 BiSECT data cleaning and transformation steps . . . . . . . . . . 110
Figure 4.13 Cyclomatic complexity distribution before (left) and after (right)
applying the BiSECT B<>>C⌘() function . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Figure 4.14 Example outcome of BiSECT 0îîA4î0C8>=() function . . . . . . 113
Figure 4.15 BiSECT as a precursor to the typical machine learning workflow . 114
Figure 4.16 BiSECTWorkflow in Example Application 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Figure 4.17 Framework for vectorizing 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences . . . . . 121
Figure 4.18 Dendrogram of x86 mnemonics embedded using Word2Vec . . . 123
Figure 4.19 Dendrogram of x86 mnemonics embedded using the fastText skipgram
algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
x
Figure 4.20 Scatterplot depicting x86 mnemonics embedded using fastText . . 126
Figure 4.21 Confusion matrix (depicted as a heatmap) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Figure 4.22 Juliet features extracted using BiSECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Figure 4.23 Distribution of samples in original and balanced Juliet C/C++ datasets 134
Figure 4.24 Evaluation metrics (Juliet with Doc2Vec and fastText) . . . . . . 135
Figure 4.25 Distribution of samples in original and balanced CB-Multios datasets 140
Figure 4.26 Evaluation metrics (CB-Multios with Doc2Vec and fastText) . . . 142
Figure 4.27 Jaccard Distance calculation for set of unique strings . . . . . . . 146
Figure 4.28 Similarity matrix for 469 test cases associated with CWE 703 . . 147
Figure 4.29 Heatmap depicting test case similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Figure 4.30 Clustermap depicting test case similarity using Euclidean distances 151
xi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 2017 Survey of vulnerability analysis techniques . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 2.2 2020 Survey of deep learning and neural network based vulnerability
analysis techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Table 2.3 CB Multi-OS description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 2.4 Juliet C#, C/C++ and Juliet Java descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 2.5 LAVA-M descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 2.6 OWASP Benchmark descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 2.7 STONESOUP descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 2.8 FLVD dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 2.9 VDISC dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 2.10 LinuxFlaw dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 2.11 Open source vulnerability datasets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 3.1 Combined descriptions of seven open source vulnerability datasets 54
Table 3.2 Confusion Matrix for Binary Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Table 3.3 Metrics proposed for BVATT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Table 3.4 Percentage of test cases in each CWE pillar by vulnerability dataset 72
Table 3.5 Simple random sample size of each CWE pillar using accepted CVEs
published from 2014-2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Table 3.6 Stratified sample size of each CWE pillar using accepted CVEs
published from 2014-2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Table 3.7 Comparison of simple and random sampling methods . . . . . . . 76
xiii
Table 3.8 Stratified sample (SS) of CVEs using CWE pillars and CWEs 1 node
away compared to available test cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Table 3.9 Stratified sample (SS) of CVEs using CWE pillars and CWEs a 
distance of two away from each pillar. CWE pillars: 284, 435, 664 79
Table 3.10 Stratified sample (SS) of CVEs using CWE pillars and CWEs a 
distance of two away from each pillar. CWE pillars: 682, 691, 693,
697, 703, 707, 710 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Table 3.11 Open source vulnerability datasets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Table 3.12 Bu er overflow characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Table 3.13 Bu er overflow basic characteristic sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Table 4.1 Description of commonly used feature types. . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Table 4.2 Description of all raw and constructed features extracted by BiSECT 98
Table 4.3 Summary of the tool or technique used to generate each feature from
binary samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Table 4.4 Example n-grams of varying granularity levels . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Table 4.5 Juliet C#, C/C++ and Juliet Java descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Table 4.6 Function breakdown in Juliet C/C++ dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Table 4.7 Accuracy, precision, recall, false positive rate (FPR), false negative
rate (FNR), and F1 metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Table 4.8 Performance metrics by CWE Pillar, Doc2Vec with random oversam-
pling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Table 4.9 Performance metrics by CWE Pillar, fastText with random oversampling 136
Table 4.10 CWE Pillar and descriptions (CWE Pillars 284 and 693 are not included
in the Juliet C\C++ dataset, and thus, not included in this experiment) 137
Table 4.11 Accuracy, precision, recall, false positive rate (FPR), false negative
rate (FNR), and F1 metrics for the original and balanced CB-Multios
datasets using Doc2Vec (deep learning) and fastText (linear classifica-
tion) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
xiv
Table 4.12 Available open-source test cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
xv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xvi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
AFL American Fuzzy Lop
AI Artificial Intelligence
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
BLSTM Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory
BVATT Benchmark for Vulnerability Analysis Tools and Techniques
CAS Center for Assured Software
CB Challenge Binary
CFE CGC Final Event
CFG Control Flow Graph
CGC Cyber Grand Challenge
CRS Cyber Reasoning System
CVE Common Vulnerability and Exposures
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DECREE DARPA Experimental Cyber Research Evaluation Environment
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
FECT Feature Extraction, Cleaning, and Transformation
FN False Negatives
FNR False Negative Rate
FP False Positives
FPR False Positive Rate
FSM Finite State Machines
xvii
IARPA Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
ICC Intraclass Correlation Coe cient
LSTM Long Short-Term Memory
NSA National Security Agency
OS Operating System
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project
PE Portable Executable
SARD Software Assurance Reference Dataset
STONESOUP Securely Taking On New Executable Software of Uncertain Provenance
TN True Negative
TP True Positive
VATT Vulnerability Analysis Tool or Technique
VPM Vulnerability Prediction Model
xviii
Acknowledgments
To my committee members, your collective knowledge of the history of computing continues 
to astound me. Your feedback and thorough reviews have enabled this work to meet its 
potential. I am honored to have been guided by each of you.
To my parents (Matt and Lisa), who never once doubted my abilities. You continually 
demonstrate faith, love, work ethic, and tenacity—these things have become pillars in 
my own life because of you. You have provided the foundation upon which I make every 
accomplishment in my life.
To Otto, who supported me throughout this endeavor even when it took me away from you 
(and the toddlers). You empowered me to rise to this challenge, celebrated every victory, and 
stood beside me during every defeat along the way. I am forever grateful. ATD. ATM.
To Leonora and Ottico, when I considered quitting (and I did), it was the thought of you that 
convinced me to persist. I hope that someday my example helps you to strive for excellence 
in spite of any adversity that you may face.
To the numerous others who supported me throughout this journey (VADM Jan Tighe, 
Jeremy, my siblings [Mariah, Scott, and Seana], my Grandfather, the Rat Pack, Dr. Lyn 
Whitaker). You believed in me, o ered constant and candid reviews of my work, cared for 
my children during the final hour, read everything that I wrote, and encouraged me. This 
work was made possible because of you. Thank you.
xix




In God we trust, all others bring data.
William E. Deming
1.1 Context
Software is pervasive. Nearly every electronic device runs embedded software. Our cars are
computer networks on wheels run by software. Our ubiquitous smartphones are powered by
operating systems that specialize in downloading apps to do common tasks. Apple currently
o ers over 2M apps in its store [1] and Google over 3M [2]. All our enterprises and all
their supply chains are run by software. Government agencies store immense amounts of
sensitive information on databases accessed through software. Utility companies manage
critical infrastructure with software. Militaries use software for planning, logistics, weapons
control, secret communications, and coordination of operations. Without software, we cannot
function.
All this software is permeated with bugs. Software is too complex to guarantee that it is
bug-free. Criminals pore through software looking for bugs they can use to make the software
attack its host and destroy, steal, or poison data. We call bugs that can be exploited in this way
“vulnerabilities.” Many vulnerabilities are the result of design or implementation mistakes
and are unknown to their developers. Attacks on such vulnerabilities are called “zero day”
because they can be launched as surprises to the victims, who have “zero days” to develop
defenses.
In recent years attacks on computer systems and their databases have exploded exponentially.
Nearly everyone is concerned with identity theft. Ransomware has become a billion dollar
enterprise [3]. We can no longer escape the nagging anxiety that our data will be lost or
stolen in attacks, that our critical infrastructures will be brought down, or that our militaries
will be unable to defend us [4], [5].
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The pervasiveness of and the need to address software vulnerabilities are the context of this
dissertation.
The downside consequences of unmitigated vulnerabilities are as immense as vulnerabilities
are pervasive. The magnitude of analysis required to detect these bugs is so immense that
even legions of experts cannot keep up with demand. Ultimately, vulnerability analysis must
be automated.
Vulnerability Analysis Tool or Techniques (VATTs) are used to augment the vulnerability
analysis process. Generally speaking, VATTs include any method (i.e., tool or technique) to
identify, analyze, or prioritize vulnerabilities in software. Some VATTs leverage static or
dynamic analysis, while others use a combination of the two to achieve their objectives.
The many existing VATTs are isolated e orts, and there is no standardized way to compare
their performances. We set out to develop a framework for a dependable benchmark
for comparing VATTs, i.e., Benchmark for Vulnerability Analysis Tools and Techniques
(BVATT), and this led us to create another new tool, BiSECT. Following, we provide the
chronicle of our work.
In attempting to identify a possible suite of test cases for BVATT we identified hundreds of
thousands test cases in numerous publicly available datasets. We soon discovered that none
of these datasets is able to represent the full range and frequency of vulnerabilities seen in the
real-world. However, by selecting segments from each existing dataset, we could construct a
new suite of problems (i.e., test cases) for BVATT that is representative of reality. To this
end, we sought an automated method to extract features from each of the compiled test
cases (software binaries) and compare those features to evaluate similarities and di erences
among the test cases. Furthermore, we demonstrated how clustering can be used to group
the vulnerabilities exhibiting similar feature sets. By using clustering, we could maximize
the diversity and comprehensiveness of BVATT.
As we ventured to cluster our compiled test cases, we were led to the second major challenge
addressed by this work— there is no tool that synthesizes the at scale extraction, cleaning,
and transformation of features commonly used in data mining and machine learning based
vulnerability analysis. We developed such a tool, and called it BiSECT. BiSECT is available
as open source. We designed BiSECT to accomplish our original task of providing the
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benchmark problems for BVATT. We also found that BiSECT can be used to directly support
at scale data mining and machine learning-based vulnerability analysis. BiSECT reduces
the barrier to entry and makes binary vulnerability analysis using data mining and machine
learning more accessible to security researchers.
The BiSECT system shows that almost anyone can use machine learning and data mining
to search for vulnerabilities in their software. To help people learn how to use BiSECT,
we prepared several Jupyter notebooks in the BiSECT repository with example problems,
walkthroughs, and additional documentation related to BiSECT.
1.2 Motivation
The motivation for the use of tools and techniques to compliment the vulnerability analysis
process is simple: the pervasiveness of and the need to address software vulnerabilities.
Between 1999 to early 2020 over 150,000 software vulnerabilities were reported by the
Common Vulnerabilities and Enumerations (CVE) database [6]. When vulnerabilities are
exploited it can have detrimental financial, social, and economic e ects. In 2020, the Ponemon
Institute reviewed over 500 data breaches (often resulting from exploited vulnerabilities [7]),
and found that the cost of a single breach averaged $3.8 million [8]. The Stuxnet and Duqu
worms demonstrated how vulnerability exploitation can go beyond financial damage, and
disrupt critical operations [9], [10]. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
identified five fundamental pillars upon which the security and resilience of cyberspace
in the United States would stand— Pillar II specified the reduction of vulnerabilities to
protect critical infrastructure and information systems [11]. Again in 2018, the Department
of the Navy established a policy called “CYBERSAFE,” that requires nearly all programs of
record to identify and reduce vulnerabilities in each system prior to deployment [12]. Despite
substantial investments in system security, vulnerabilities persist. In 2020, the Sunburst
malware was used to compromise thousands of government systems and an estimated 18,000
firms [13]. Recent data exfiltration [14] and ransomware [15] attacks further illustrate
the cybersecurity problem. To reiterate the importance of system security, the Department
of Defense (DOD) allocated $9.85 billion to the cybersecurity domain in 2021, with $841
million specifically allocated to cybersecurity-related artificial intelligence activities [16].
Still, the question remains: how can we identify and reduce software vulnerabilities? One
reduction approach is to begin with the assumption that all software contains vulnerabilities,
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and then test each program to find as many vulnerabilities as possible [17].
Software testing techniques can be broadly classified as either static or dynamic. Simply
stated, during static testing or analysis the program under test is not executed, whereas in
dynamic analysis, it is. Control and data flow analysis, static symbolic execution, human code
reviews and walkthroughs, and basic lexical analysis are examples of static analysis [18].
Debugging, taint analysis, fuzzing, and dynamic symbolic execution are forms of dynamic
analysis [19]. Most dynamic analysis techniques require test cases to be either manually or
automatically generated. Manually analyzing software and developing test cases requires
domain expertise, is expensive, and time consuming [20]. Further, the limited number of
specialists able to perform manual vulnerability analysis does not scale to the amount,
complexity, and variety of software to be secured [20]–[22]. Researchers and consumers
therefore rely on vulnerability analysis tools and techniques to augment the vulnerability
analysis process. The importance of VATTs continues to be emphasized.
1.2.1 Motivating a Framework for BVATT
In May 2021, a ransomware attack was successfully launched against the Colonial Pipeline
which provides nearly 45% of the fuel in the Eastern United States. Shortly after the attack,
the US government issued an order requiring the development of guidance related to the
employment of, “automated tools, or comparable processes, that check for known and
potential vulnerabilities” [23].
Significant progress has been made to support the vulnerability analysis process using an
array of tools and techniques, and while there are a few useful resources [24]–[26], a standard
benchmark for VATTs has yet to be adopted by the community.
Researchers have highlighted the impact of the absence of such a benchmark [25], [27],
[28]. For example, there is no standard method to assess the relative e cacy of VATTs. We
have no comparative metrics of the types of vulnerabilities each tool and technique can
or cannot find, how quickly they can do so, or the number of false positives they report.
When a consumer wants to employ a VATT they have no standard method of comparing the
alternatives to determine which is the optimal choice for their use case. When a developer
wants to modify an existing VATT, or enter the market with a new one, no benchmark is
available to compare their VATT against existing ones. Consumers and developers therefore
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compare VATTs in a disjointed fashion, which can result in misinformation, subjectivity,
and inconsistency.
A common comparison approach is to assess the relative performance of di erent tools
and techniques using a collection of test cases containing known vulnerabilities. These test
cases are often organized into public or proprietary datasets. Hundreds of thousands of
publicly available test cases containing known software flaws and vulnerabilities have been
aggregated into datasets, each with its own structure, supported languages, and reporting
method. Databases such as the Software Assurance Reference Dataset (SARD) attempt
to inject order by providing a consolidated repository of vulnerability datasets and test
cases [24]. Unfortunately, even the SARD, which contains 40 datasets and over 170K test
cases, is not exhaustive— it excludes datasets such as the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC)
Corpus [26], LAVA-M [25], and Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Bench-
mark Project [29]. Additionally, many of these datasets contain an unrealistic representation
of weakness types, i.e., Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entries, when compared
to known vulnerability instances in the wild, i.e., accepted Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) entries [22]. Consequently, even if a VATT was assessed using all 170K
of the SARD test cases, the results would still not reflect reality. Furthermore, while the
vulnerabilities in some datasets are labeled at a function level, most are labeled at a file level.
Labeling vulnerabilities with a finer granularity allows for a more insightful and quantitative
assessment of the performance of di erent VATTs [27], [28], [30], [31]. Finally, while some
of the datasets include real-world code (e.g., LAVA-M [25], and STONESOUP [32]) most are
comprised of entirely synthetic code. Pure synthetic vulnerabilities are sometimes criticized
for being overly simplistic and not representative of vulnerabilities in the real-world [27],
[28].
Based on the various limitations of existing datasets, and the absence of a benchmark
we surmised that the community is in need of an overarching framework to guide the
implementation of BVATT.
1.2.2 Motivating an At-Scale Binary Code Feature Extraction Tool
In addition to conventional static and dynamic techniques, in the past decade researchers
have begun leveraging machine learning and data mining techniques to identify, predict, and
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prioritize vulnerabilities [27], [28], [33]–[36]. At the time of this writing, two major surveys
of these techniques have been published. In 2017, Gha arian and Shahriari provided a
survey of work that uses conventional machine learning or data mining techniques to identify
and analyze software vulnerabilities [27]. Then, in 2020, Lin, et al. surveyed vulnerability
detection methods that leverage deep learning and neural networks [28]. From these surveys
we make two key observations:
1. The first four steps of the data mining process include data cleaning, integration,
selection, and transformation [37]. While machine learning typically begins with the
transformation step, it is assumed that certain preprocessing steps, i.e., steps 1-3 in the
data mining process, have already been completed [38]. Both the machine learning
and data mining processes also assume that the initial dataset has already been created.
We find these assumptions to be significant, as the extraction and transformation of
even a single feature from a binary file requires domain expertise.
2. Of the 39 publications reviewed in the 2017 survey a total of 3, or roughly 8% [39]–[41],
used binaries to support their research (including one sample that used both binary
and source code samples), while the remaining 92% relied on source code level
samples. In the 2020 survey, a total of 19 works published between 2013 and 2019
were reviewed. In this survey, 4 out of the 19 used compiled code samples to support
their work [40], [42]–[44]1, 2 used a mix of binary and source code samples [45], [46],
and the remaining 13 used source code samples – 6 out of 19, or roughly 32%, is a
noteworthy increase from the mere 8% in the 2017 survey of conventional machine
learning and data mining research that used binary samples [27]. Yet, the disparity
between vulnerability analysis using source code versus compiled code persists.
We believe that the di erence between vulnerability analysis using source code verses
compiled code may be correlated to the fact that during the compilation process much of the
semantic and syntactic information o ered by high-level languages (e.g., C, Java, etc.) is
lost, which results in samples that are more di cult to analyze [21], [47], [48]. In turn, this
level of di culty has an inverse relationship with the number of researchers using binary
samples to support their work— as observed in the 58 papers reviewed in the two surveys
where only 3% leveraged binary samples [27], [28].
1Grieco, et al. [40] was referenced in both the 2017 and 2020 survey
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Yet, there are situations when the analysis of binary samples is desirable or necessary. For
example, a user may need to validate that properties proven by analyzing a program’s source
code still hold after the program has been compiled, or they simply may not have access to a
program’s source code [21], [47], [49], [50].
1.2.3 Challenges
The influx and array of VATTs to support the vulnerability analysis process, including those
that leverage machine learning and data mining, has resulted in two major challenges that
are addressed in our research. We summarize these challenges as follows:
Challenge 1: There is no comprehensive method to assess the e cacy of VATTs. We have no
comparative metrics of the types of vulnerabilities each tool can or cannot find, how quickly
they can do so, or the number of false positives they report. So, when a consumer wants
to use a vulnerability analysis tool, they have no method of comparing the alternatives to
determine which is a good choice for a specific use case. When a developer wants to modify
their tool or enter the market with a new one, no standard method is available to compare
their VATT against existing ones. Consequently, consumers and developers compare tools
in a disjointed fashion, which can result in misinformation, subjectivity, redundancy, and
inconsistency.
Based on the limitations of existing datasets and the absence of a community-accepted bench-
mark, the community is in need of an overarching framework to guide the implementation
of BVATTs. The framework for BVATT should include both the core characteristics of the
benchmark, and metrics that can be used to quantitatively compare VATTs.
Challenge 2: There is no tool to synthesize the at-scale extraction, cleaning, and transfor-
mation of features commonly used in data mining and machine learning-based vulnerability
analysis Thus, current research in this area is limited to a niche group of computer scientists
with the requisite domain expertise in machine learning and binary vulnerability analysis.
This disconnect acts as barrier to both security and machine learning researchers, and
ultimately limits advancements in a promising area of vulnerability analysis.
Instead, we need to get to a place where a vulnerability analyst can succinctly extract
common features from hundreds of binaries using a single tool. The tool should also clean
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and transform those features so that they’re compatible with machine learning and data
mining techniques.
1.3 Contributions
This study makes several contributions.
1. We synthesize 839 CWEs with over 75,000 CVEs to determine the relative proportions
of vulnerability instances and weakness types in the real-world.
2. We analyze four popular software vulnerability datasets, and show that none accurately
represents vulnerability instances and weakness types as they occur in the wild.
3. We provide a framework for a benchmark for vulnerability analysis tools and techniques
(BVATT).
4. We provide the tool, BiSECT (Binary Synthesized Extraction, Cleaning, and Transfor-
mation), to extract common features from binaries and transform them into a format
compatible with data mining and machine learning techniques.
5. We use the output of BiSECT to assess the e cacy of two representation models (and
corresponding classifiers), fastText and Doc2Vec, when they are given the task of
labeling potentially vulnerable functions.
6. We examine the impact of using balanced and imbalanced datasets when training the
fastText and Doc2Vec classifiers on binary samples.
7. We use BiSECT to prepare 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences in support of binary vulnera-
bility analysis.
8. We use the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences to train a classifier able to label function-level
vulnerabilities in a balanced hybrid-synthetic assembly code base with 96.4% accuracy,
97.8% precision, 94.8% recall, a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 2.1%, False Negative
Rate (FNR) of 5.2%, and F1 of 96.3%.
9. We demonstrate how BiSECT can be leveraged to identify the most diverse test cases
in a test suite.
1.4 Organization
The organization of this dissertation is as follows.
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• Chapter 1 provides an introduction and motivation for the research.
• Chapter 2 defines terms used throughout this work, provides a brief overview of vul-
nerability analysis techniques, and describes current methods to compare vulnerability
analysis techniques. Chapter 2 concludes with an overview of research related to the
use of data mining, machine learning, and deep learning techniques to support the
vulnerability analysis process.
• Chapter 3 addresses Challenge 1 as specified in 1.2.3, and provides a framework for
BVATT. Chapter 3 also identifies the limitations of current datasets, including the
misrepresentation of weakness types and vulnerability instances. Chapter 3 identifies
what a representative suite of benchmark problems should look like, and finally, sets
the stage for BiSECT. Contributions 1-3 are detailed in Chapter 3.
• Chapter 4 addresses Challenge 2, and describes a new tool, BiSECT (Binary Syn-
thesized Extraction, Cleaning, and Transformation). BiSECT was created to support
vulnerability research, and provides a user-friendly and repeatable means to synthesize
the extraction, cleaning and transformation of common features from binary files in a
format compatible with data mining and machine learning techniques. To demonstrate
the various utilities of BiSECT, two example applications are provided in Chapter 4.
Contributions 4-9 are detailed in Chapter 4.
• Finally, Chapter 5, presents a summary of our work. Chapter 5 includes a review of
the major challenges addressed throughout this research, followed by a discussion of
our findings, and finally, with recommendations for future research.
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This chapter provides the necessary background to set the stage for the remainder of our
research. To summarize, our research is comprised of two parts: a framework for BVATT,
and a means to extract common features from binary samples in support of machine learning
and data mining based vulnerability research, i.e., the BiSECT tool.
In Section 2.2 we precisely define key terms associated with software vulnerability analysis
and machine learning as they will be used in this work. These terms are followed by a
brief history and overview of key vulnerability analysis techniques in Section 2.3. We
review early static analysis techniques in Section 2.3.2 and dynamic analysis techniques in
Section 2.3.3. In Section 2.3.4 we review more recent vulnerability analysis techniques that
leverage machine learning and data mining. Then, current vulnerability analysis techniques
that use deep learning and neural networks are explored in Section 2.3.5. After reviewing
vulnerability analysis techniques, we explore current methods to compare VATTs in Section
2.4. Finally, Chapter 2 is concluded with an examination of tools that can be used to extract
one or more features from compiled code (i.e., binary) samples.
2.2 Terms
In this section we clarify our use of terms referenced throughout this work that may be
ambiguous due to multiple and sometimes vague definitions. These terms include bug,
vulnerability, data mining, and machine learning. Related terms are also included for
clarity. In several cases we introduce a term by attempting to pinpoint its origin. We feel
that providing the etymology of the terms helps provide a bit of additional context to the
reader. For example, the latter part of our research (Chapter 4) deals heavily with terms and
concepts related to Artificial Intelligence (AI), but not necessarily AI as it was defined in
the mid-1900s. Where appropriate, we have also included some background information




Grace Hopper provided one of the earliest recorded uses of the term bug in the context of a
computer. In 1947, a moth that was caught between relay contacts caused an issue with the
Harvard Mark II computer. Hopper taped the moth to the computer’s log book and next to it
noted (Figure 2.1), “First actual case of bug being found” [51].
Figure 2.1. Grace Hopper log book with computer bug. Source [51].
However, the term bug can be traced back even further. In the 1870s Thomas Edison used it to
describe various issues with his inventions. In one example Edison states, “This thing gives
out and then that ‘Bugs’—as such little faults and di culties are called— show themselves
and months of intense watching, study and labor are requisite before commercial success or
failure is certainly reached” [52]. In, Etymology of the Computer Bug: History and Folklore,
1987, Fred Shapiro defines a bug as, “a defect in hardware or software” [53]. We draw on
these early definitions of the term, and define a bug as: a fault or defect in the hardware or
software of a machine.
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We refer to the following terms in accordance with their definitions provided by Melliar-
Smith [54] and Denning [55]:
• A failure is an event at which a system violates its specifications
• An error is an item of information which, when processed by the normal algorithms
of the system, will produce a failure
• A fault is a mechanic algorithmic defect which may generate an error
• A defect is an imperfection or deficiency
Using these definitions we refer to the term software bug as a defect in the software of a
machine.
2.2.2 Software Vulnerability
The CVE defines a vulnerability as [56],
a weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and some
hardware components (e.g., firmware) that, when exploited, results in a negative
impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
Vulnerabilities therefore are the subset of bugs that:
1. are exploitable; and,
2. when exploited, result in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
Exploitable in this context simply means able to be used for a particular purpose. A
software vulnerability is a software bug that, when exploited, results in a negative impact
to confidentiality, integrity, or availability. We refer to the following terms in accordance to
their definitions in United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 44 [57]:
• Confidentiality: Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclo-
sure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.
• Integrity: Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.
• Availability: Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.
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2.2.3 Data Mining
Han, Kamber, and Pei describe data mining as the process of discovering patterns from large
amounts of data [37]. The authors describe data mining as an iterative form of knowledge








Steps one through four in the data mining process are types of preprocessing, where data is
prepared for mining (i.e., discovery), evaluation, and finally, presentation [37]. These steps
begin after an initial dataset has been gathered.
2.2.4 Artificial Intelligence
Much like the term bug, the precise origins of AI are di cult to pinpoint. It seems that a
number of ideas related to AI surfaced around World War II. For example, in an unpublished
1939 article titled, Mechanization and the Record, Vannevar Bush described a machine (later
called “memex”) that could operate similar to a human brain [58]. The machine combined
lower level technologies to achieve higher level functionality. In 1947, Alan Turing also
pondered the possibility of intelligent machines [59]. Turing compared such machines to a
student who first learned from his master, then added his own work.
Recently, new perspectives on artificial intelligence have been proposed. For example, Peter
Denning and Ted Lewis provide a modern hierarchical classification of learning machines
(i.e., levels 0-4) capped by AI aspirations (i.e., levels 5 and 6). Their classification, organized
by relative learning power, is shown in Figure 2.2. The authors state that the ultimate goal
for AI is, “to construct machines that are at least as smart as humans at specific tasks” [60].
The classification proposed by Denning and Lewis illuminates the limitations corresponding
to each learning mechanism. The authors distinguish each level according to the functions
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that can be learned, and assert that using such a hierarchy none of the current AI machines
actually have intelligence [60]. In the remainder of this section we discuss terms related to
two levels in the hierarchy specifically relevant to our work: supervised and unsupervised
learning.
Figure 2.2. Hierarchy of artificial intelligence machines. Source [60].
Machine Learning
Machine learning is a branch of AI that refers to machines that acquire new functions by
being trained from large data sets. Major focus areas in machine learning include: prediction,
classification, and clustering tasks [38]. Two common machine learning types (sometimes
referred to as “scenarios”): supervised and unsupervised learning, are identified as levels 2
and 3 in the Denning and Lewis hierarchy [60]. In supervised and unsupervised learning
the basic objective is to make predictions about an outcome given some input. Two major
di erences between these learning scenarios are the type of training data that is made
available to the machine, and the order in which the training and test data are used. In this
context, the machine simply refers to the prediction model that is used, the training data
are the data used to train the machine, and the test data are the data used to evaluate the
machine’s performance [38]. For the purpose of this research, we focus on these learning
scenarios. In supervised learning predictions are made about new data based on a set of
labeled training data, whereas, in unsupervised learning predictions about new data are
made based on a set of unlabeled training data [38].
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We call out these steps to provide additional context for our work. More specifically, machine
learning and data mining are often used in conjunction to one another. For example, machine
learning may be used in the data mining “Pattern Discovery” and “Pattern Evaluation” steps,
while the data “Cleaning”, “Integration”, “Selection”, and “Transformation” steps from the
data mining process may be used to accomplish the machine learning “Data Preprocessing”
step. The BiSECT tool (detailed in Chapter 4), that is able to perform feature extraction,
cleaning, and transformation is relevant to both the machine learning and data mining
processes (thanks to their overlap).
Deep Neural Networks
A subset of both AI and machine learning is deep neural networks (this term is often
used interchangeably with, deep learning). In 1944, Warren McCullough and Walter Pitts
proposed the first neural network. The McCullough and Pitts neural network was based on
the idea that neural events and relationships in the nervous system could be modeled using
propositional and symbolic logic [61]. Aggarwal reflects that neural networks were originally
developed to, “simulate the human nervous system for machine learning tasks by treating
the computational units in a learning model in a manner similar to human neurons” [62].
In 1958, Frank Rosenblatt published a cornerstone work titled, Organization of a perceptron.
Rosenblatt’s perceptron, depicted in Figure 2.3, modeled a hypothetical nervous system, and
was first implemented on the [general purpose] IBM 704 machine [63]. Unlike McCullough
and Pitts, whose neural network was based on symbolic logic, this perceptron was based on
probability theory.
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Figure 2.3. Organization of a perceptron. Source: [63].
A neural network consists of one or more artificial neurons, which communicate with one
another [64]. The output of one artificial neuron is the input to another. Today, a perceptron
is regarded as the simplest form of a neural network, that is, a neural network that contains a
single input layer where a set of inputs is directly mapped to an output using a generalized
linear function [62].
Simply stated, deep learning models are deeper variants of neural networks, that is, they
are neural networks with multiple linear or non-linear layers. Deep learning networks can be
trained using supervised and unsupervised learning [64]. In the past decade deep learning
techniques have made significant strides towards e ciently analyzing complex, noisy, and
high-dimensional data— these limitations are often seen in conventional machine learning
models [65].
Like both the data mining and machine learning processes, the deep learning process begins
with the preprocessing of data [62]. For this reason, much of the functionality provided by
the BiSECT tool introduced in Chapter 4 is also relevant to deep learning scenarios.
2.3 Vulnerability Analysis Techniques
In this section we explore four major categories of techniques to support the vulnerability
analysis process. We first review early static and dynamic analysis techniques, then more
recent vulnerability analysis techniques that leverage machine learning, data mining, and
deep learning are explored. Throughout this work, we refer to these techniques, and the
numerous tools based on them as “VATTs”. To date, there is no standard method to compare
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VATTs. Consumers and developers currently make comparisons of VATTs by assessing
their relative performances using internally developed or publicly available vulnerability
datasets [25]. After reviewing the four major categories of VATTs, we examine datasets that
can be used to compare them in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Introduction
In 1936, Alan Turing proved that no algorithm can exist to determine whether an arbitrary
program will halt given some input [66]. Turing’s proof, describing the Halting Problem,
provided a conceptual basis for reasoning about programs. Some may contend that program
analysis can be traced back even further to the “Enchantress of Number,” Ada Lovelace.
In 1842, Augusta Ada King, Countess of Lovelace (generally referred to as Ada Lovelace),
translated an article by Luigi Menabrea that described Charles Babbage’s Analytical
Engine [20]. In her translation, she included a set of notes that explained the Engine and
described its limitations. Ada also provided a step by step symbolic trace (i.e., a program
analysis technique) depicting how the Analytical Engine would compute the Bernoulli
Numbers [20].
These early examples are presented to both demystify program analysis, which is arguably
as old as computing itself, and to set the stage for modern vulnerability analysis. In the
remainder of this section we review four overarching types of vulnerability analysis techniques.
First, conventional static analysis techniques are introduced, followed by dynamic analysis
techniques such as symbolic execution and fuzzing. Then, we review machine learning and
data mining techniques, and finally, we explore vulnerability analysis techniques using deep
learning.
A Note on Soundness and Completeness
As a result of the Halting Problem [66], and Rice’s Theorems [67], we know that most
program analysis problems are undecidable in the general case. That is, no such algorithm
exists for these types of problems that is both sound and complete. In the context of
vulnerability identification, soundness means that if a vulnerability is reported then it is
indeed a vulnerability (i.e., there are no false positives), and completeness means that all
vulnerabilities are found (i.e., there are no false negatives) [68]. Thus, a vulnerability analysis
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system that is both sound and complete would be able to report with certainty whether
any program is secure, or not— We know that such a system cannot exist. In practice, this
means that each vulnerability analysis tool and technique must compromise either soundness,
completeness, or both. For example, a VATT with a higher level of completeness may have
less soundness– meaning more false positives are reported [68]. Throughout this work we
maintain the perspective that the goal is never a perfect solution, rather it is to provide an
improved or novel approximate solution.
2.3.2 Static Analysis
Skipping forward over a century past Ada Lovelace’s program analysis work, the Lint system
was invented in 1978 to statically analyze C source code [69]. During static analysis an
abstract representation of the program under test is often created. Such a representation
allows the analyst to reason about the program without executing it, and typically includes
information about the program’s symbols (e.g., variables and types), a control flow graph,
and a call graph.
Lint and other first-generation static analysis tools focused on type checking, and applied
Unix-like grep functionality to determine if potentially unsafe functions, such as gets,
were found in source code. While having any tool at that time was an improvement over
manual analysis, these early static analysis VATTs were criticized for their lack of lexical
analysis. The tools could determine the presence of gets but they could not determine if it
was a function, comment, or variable, and thus they often reported a high number of false
positives [69]. For reference, gets is used to retrieve a single line of input from standard
input, and is known to be vulnerable to bu er overflows [70].
Second generation static analysis tools such as PScan [71], RATS [72], ITS4 [73], Splint [74],
and Flawfinder [75] o ered a number of improvements including lexical analysis and
tokenization to provide a higher level of semantic insight. These tools could di erentiate
between the various uses of gets, yet, there seemed to be a direct correlation between the
enhanced functionality and the number of false positives the tools reported. Since static
analysis tools do not describe how a vulnerability can be exploited, users must manually
investigate every potential bug reported to determine if a legitimate vulnerability is present.
These problems persisted in the next generation of tools, and the pattern revealed a major
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limitation of static analysis, precision.
Precision provides a measure of correctness for the positive predictions reported by a static
analysis tool, and can be calculated using the following formula (precision is discussed in
more detail in Sections 3.2 and 4.5.1),
Precision =
)%
)% +  % (2.1)
Where, TP is the number of true positives, and FP is the number of false positives.
Listing 2.1 provides a simple example demonstrating the weaknesses of static analysis. Static
analysis tools would likely report a False Positives (FP) at the conditional !1, even though 1
will never be null. Static analysis tools may miss the out of bounds memory read and write
associated with <~_0AA. Even today, static analysis tools may report the existence of these
vulnerabilities, but do not provide information on how to trigger them.
Listing 2.1: Simple C example depicting weaknesses of static analysis.
1 int main(void) {
2 int b = 2;
3 int my_arr[10];
4
5 if (!b) { //FP
6 my_arr[13] = 37; //FN




In a personal interview, Peter Denning o ered the following parallel between dynamic
analysis of vulnerabilities and operating systems— Before the process abstraction was
accepted, operating systems were seen as assemblies of modules and interfaces. Serious
20
problems such as race conditions, deadlocks, and busy waiting, etc. were totally invisible
in the modules structure. You could plainly see them, however, as problems in interactions
among dynamic processes.
Dynamic analysis provides a similar benefit when identifying software vulnerabilities.
During dynamic analysis a program under test is executed in an emulated or actual
environment, providing the analyst with run-time data. Like a race condition, vulnerabilities
that may have been hidden during static analysis become glaringly evident during dynamic
analysis.
In dynamic vulnerability analysis, execution can be performed either symbolically or using
concrete test cases, and thus, dynamic analysis techniques can be further delineated into two
categories: symbolic and concrete. In dynamic symbolic execution a program is executed
using symbolic values and multiple control flow paths can be examined, whereas in concrete
execution a program is executed using concrete values (i.e., test cases) and a single control
flow path is explored [19].
In the next few sections we describe two common concrete-dynamic vulnerability analysis
techniques: fuzzing and dynamic taint analysis. This is followed by an overview of dynamic
symbolic execution.
Fuzzing
On a stormy night in 1989 Barton Miller was logged into his workstation using a dial-up line.
As he typed commands into his terminal the storm scrambled some of the characters, and
Miller was intrigued to discover that these spurious characters often caused the programs
to crash [76]. Miller and his team leveraged this accidental discovery and developed a
systematic way to test programs for bugs, a technique they dubbed, fuzzing. The discovery
team outlined their fuzzing technique in four steps [76],
1. Construct a program to generate random characters, plus a program to
help test interactive utilities.
2. Use these programs to test a large number of utilities on random input
strings to see if they crash.
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3. Identify the strings (or types of strings) that crash these programs.
4. Identify the cause of the program crashes and categorize the common
mistakes that cause these crashes.
Fuzzing techniques have advanced in the past 30 years, yet the original four-step procedure
remains largely the same. Step 1 describes the generation of random characters or test cases
to test a program. Generating test cases continues to be a necessary step in the fuzzing
process, and carefully crafting these cases is critical to the success of the fuzzer. Fuzzers can
be broadly classified into three categories: mutation, generation, and evolutionary-based
fuzzers. Mutation-based fuzzers create test cases by applying mutations to existing data;
generation-based fuzzers use a specification (or similar documentation) which describes
the target protocol or file format, to generate test cases; and evolutionary fuzzers learn the
desired input format by utilizing feedback from each test case iteration [77], [78]. Even with
the careful generation of test cases to guide a fuzzer all fuzzer categories have been criticized
for their inability to discover anything other than superficial or shallow bugs [79]–[81].
To mitigate this limitation, coverage-based fuzzers like American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) focus
on maximizing the amount of code executed in a target application [82]. Unfortunately,
coverage-based fuzzers are still unable to understand the underlying logic of the code they’re
executing [83]. While they can e ectively find vulnerabilities caused by a single input vector,
these fuzzers struggle to discover more complex vulnerabilities, or vulnerabilities that require
more than one input vector in order to be triggered [83].
Listing 2.2 demonstrates a limitation of fuzzing techniques. In this example, adapted from
Stephens et al., a configuration file is parsed which contains a magic number received via in
input stream. If the received input contains an incorrect or poorly formatted magic number,
the program exits. Otherwise, the program control flow varies based on specified conditions
and a memory corruption flaw may occur. The fuzzer will likely get stuck during the first
comparison with the magic number and never reach the memory corruption errors [80].
Dynamic Taint Analysis
In 1976, Dorothy Denning explored the use of a lattice model for secure information flow [84].
Denning argued that a formal model was necessary to prevent the unauthorized flow of
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Listing 2.2: C example demonstrating a weakness of fuzzing. Adapted from [80]
1 int main(void) {
2 config t *config = read_config();
3 if(config == NULL) {




8 // magic number check << fuzzer stuck here
9 if(config->magic != MAGICNUMBER) {





15 char *directive = config->directives[0];
16 if (!strcmp(directive, "crashstring")) {
17 program_bug();
18 } else if (!strcmp(directive, "set option")) {
19 set_option(config->directives[1]);




information in a computer system. In 1977, Dorothy and Peter Denning proposed a compile-
time method, leveraging the lattice model and static analysis, to certify secure information
flow in programs [85]. The pioneering work of the Dennings laid the foundation for modern
information flow control techniques including dynamic taint analysis and symbolic execution.
Dynamic taint analysis focuses on determining which computations are impacted by tainted
sources. Values are considered tainted if their computation depends on data derived from
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a predefined taint source, otherwise the value is considered untainted [19]. Dynamic taint
analysis can be used to observe how information flows between untrusted sources and sinks.
False positives are called overtainting, and occur during dynamic taint analysis when a value
that is not a derivative of a taint source is mistakenly marked as tainted. Conversely, false
negatives, or undertainting, occur when the information flow between an untrusted source
and sink is not reported during analysis [19]. To use taint analysis the user must specify a
policy that includes information about taint introduction, propagation, and checking. Taint
introduction simply refers to how a new taint is introduced to the program, taint propagation
specifies the current taint status of data derived from tainted or untainted sources, and taint
checking details when to modify the runtime behavior (e.g., halt execution) of the program
based on current taint propagation status [19].
Unless otherwise specified, during dynamic taint analysis taint may only be added and is not
removed. As the program executes this can lead to an exponential increase in the number
of values that are tainted, and a decrease in precision occurs [19]. Additionally, pure taint
analysis only reports the presence of tainted values using a single execution stream at a time.
Thus, it does not compute control-dependencies that would only be discovered by reasoning
about multiple execution paths [19].
Listing 2.3 demonstrates one of the weaknesses of dynamic taint analysis. In this example,
there is an implicit control flow between 0 and 1. While there is no direct or explicit flow (e.g.
where 0 = 1), when the code is executed 1 implicitly obtains the value of 0. This transfer
may cause undertainting to occur. When 0 = 5 0;B4 and 0 is tainted, the first branch will be
executed, but the second branch will not be executed. In this case, 1 is not tainted while 1
depends on 0 [86].
Dynamic Symbolic Execution
Unlike concrete execution which uses concrete values to test a program, during dynamic
symbolic execution a program is executed using symbolic values. Symbolic values are used
to create a logical formula to represent the execution state of the program. This process
allows a program to be reasoned about using many di erent inputs concurrently [19]. When
a program branches the symbolic execution engine explores both paths and records a set
of constraints, or path conditions, that must hold for each path to be taken. Path conditions
contain information about the constraints on inputs that were used to reach a specific program
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Listing 2.3: C example demonstrating a control-flow limitation of taint analysis.
Adapted from [86].




5 a = usr_val;
6
7 bool b = false;
8 bool c = false;
9
10 if (!a) {
11 c = true;
12 }
13
14 if (!c) {
15 b = true;
16 }
17 }
state [87]. Then, when the path eventually terminates or a vulnerability is discovered, a
constraint solver is invoked to produce a concrete path from the generated symbolic path and
corresponding constraints. This path then becomes a concrete test case that can be used to
lead execution to a precise point in the program.
Like other testing methodologies symbolic execution faces numerous challenges in practice.
Complex memory management, library and system calls, path explosion, and constraint
solver limitations are just a few of the reasons that symbolic execution remains a costly
testing technique that does not scale well to real-world applications [19]–[21], [80], [88].
For example, program loops and function calls cause a symbolic executor to branch numerous
times and can create an explosion in the number of paths and states to explore. This phenomena
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is commonly referred to as the path explosion problem [19]. The path explosion problem
has been shown to be directly correlated to the amount of computational memory and time
required to symbolically analyze a program. As the number of states nears infinity during
analysis, the ability to exhaustively analyze a program via symbolic execution can quickly
become intractable, i.e., no e cient algorithm exists to solve it. The path explosion problem
creates a significant limitation for using symbolic execution to discover vulnerabilities in
real-world applications [19], [21], [80], [88].
The path explosion problem is demonstrated in Listing 2.4. In this example, from [20], the 5 >A
loop results in 2100 paths for the symbolic execution engine to explore. The path explosion
problem is exacerbated in real-world applications where loops and recursive functions have
much greater frequency and complexity, and often results in dynamic symbolic execution only
discovering shallow bugs. There have been several attempts to mitigate the path explosion
problem, but none has provided an absolute solution [88].
In addition to conventional static and dynamic techniques researchers also leverage conven-
tional machine learning and data mining techniques to support vulnerability analysis. Recent
work in these areas are discussed in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.4 Machine Learning and Data Mining
In 2017, Gha arian and Shahriari surveyed conventional machine learning and data mining
techniques used to support vulnerability analysis. They partitioned the works reviewed into
four major categories [27]:
1. Vulnerability Prediction Models based on Software Metrics
2. Anomaly Detection Approaches
3. Vulnerable Code Pattern Recognition
4. Miscellaneous
Gha arian and Shahriari further delineated the reviewed work into those that make use of
program syntax and semantics and those that do not. Sethi provides the following definitions
for syntax and semantics, ”The syntax of a language specifies how programs in the language
are built up. The semantics of the language specifies what programs mean“ [89].
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Listing 2.4: C example demonstrating the path explosion problem. Source [20].
1 int main(void) {
2
3 char buf[32];
4 char *data = read_string();
5
6 // Symbolic execution will suffer from path explosion
7 int count = 0;
8
9 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {





15 if (count >= 8 && count <= 16) {




Syntax in the context of a program refers to the program’s structure, while semantics has to
do with the program’s meaning. Techniques leveraging program syntax include anomaly
detection approaches and vulnerable code pattern recognition. Semantics are often gathered
by studying input/output relationships. Techniques leveraging program semantics include
vulnerability prediction models based on software metrics, and a number of miscellaneous
works that do not fit well into any of the other categories.
In total, the authors surveyed 39 machine learning and data mining approaches related to






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As summarized in Figure 2.4, of the 39 publications reviewed a total of 3, or roughly 8%
( [39]–[41]) used compiled samples to support their work (including one “mixed” that used
both binary and source code samples), while the remaining 92% relied on source code level
samples.
Figure 2.4. Granularity of work reviewed in Ghaffarian and Shahriari 2017
survey. Of the 39 publications reviewed, 8% leveraged binary samples. Adapted
from [27].
Figure 2.5 provides a treemap depicting the count of each predictor used in the research
reviewed in the survey. The most common predictors included API usage, complexity, and
function metrics. We provide a brief overview of the three primary categories that were
reviewed in the survey in the following sections. These categories include software metrics,
anomaly detection approaches, and vulnerable code pattern recognition.
Software Metrics
In the mid-1960s, the number of “lines of code” was used as a measure of programmer
productivity. This is often regarded as the first software metric [120]. The IEEE Standard
Glossary of Software Engineering Technology defines a metric as, “a quantitative measure
of the degree to which a system, component, or process possesses a given attribute” [121].
The term software metrics can be used to describe the collection of various activities related
to quantitative measurement in software [120]. Examples of software metrics include lines of




















Figure 2.5. Treemap of predictors used in vulnerability analysis techniques
that use machine learning or data mining according to a 2017 survey. Adapted
from [27].
These metrics (and others) have been used in numerous studies, with varying levels of
success, related to vulnerability identification and analysis [27], [33]–[36].
After software metrics have been gathered, learning or classification algorithms are applied
to the dataset to create a Vulnerability Prediction Model (VPM), that is, a model used to
classify software components as [likely] vulnerable or not vulnerable [27]. This process is
described in Figure 2.6 [122].
In addition to software metrics, text mining (also referred to as text analysis) approaches
can also be used to create VPMs [123]. Like other software models (e.g., Defect Prediction
Models), the primary objective for VPMs is not to identify true vulnerabilities, rather it
is to support the testing and code review process by prioritizing testing e orts based on
the likelihood that a software component is or is not vulnerable [123]. Software metrics
are often readily available or easily obtained throughout the software engineering process
for source code, making this type of vulnerability analysis attractive for its convenience.
However, VPMs su er from multiple challenges in practice.
For example, imbalanced class data, or datasets with a disproportionate ratio of vulnerable
to non-vulnerable code can skew VPM results [27], [124]. Additionally, VPMs based on
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Figure 2.6. Vulnerability Prediction Model (VPM) Pipeline. Source [122].
software metrics are often built for a single project, and have minimal success when applied
to another project (this is sometimes referred to as cross-project VPM, or cross-project
prediction). Researchers have attempted to mitigate this limitation by using feature or
attribute dimensionality reduction. Dimensionality reduction techniques can be used to
reduce overfitting, which occurs when a VPM is too specific to the training dataset that was
used to create it [124]. Finally, code metric based VPMs have been criticized for having
a lack of semantic information included in the model, however, researchers have begun
to apply deep learning techniques to collect rich semantic and syntactic information from
source code [125].
Anomaly Detection Approaches
In 1986, Dorothy Denning described an approach to detect security violations using abnormal
patterns of a system’s usage, i.e., anomalies [126]. Denning’s work became the basis for
early network intrusion detection systems, many of which still leverage anomaly detection
approaches today. In the past decade researchers have applied anomaly detection approaches
to other areas of security, such as the identification and analysis of vulnerabilities. Similar to
the approach developed by Denning, anomaly detection approaches within the context of
software vulnerability analysis aim to identify patterns, and deviations or anomalies, from
those patterns.
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Gha arian and Shahriari surveyed a number of anomaly detection approaches, most leveraged
data mining techniques to mine API usage and identify patterns in source code, and a few
mined graphical representations of the source code (e.g., program dependency graphs) [27].
In both scenarios API rules, legal operations, itemsets, or invocation sequences can be mined
to capture normal or expected call patterns. These patterns are abstracted and represented by
Finite State Machines (FSM), which are then used to quickly identify anomalies.
As an example, Figure 2.7 describes an anomaly-based vulnerability detection approach
proposed by Wasylkowski [101]. In their approach, legal method or function call sequences
are mined from the API, and used to develop a model for each method. This model is
abstracted to create a general usage model, which in turn is used to identify and flag anomalies
















































Anomaly detection approaches are criticized for having a high false-positive rate, meaning,
that they flag non-vulnerable code as vulnerable. This is sometimes attributed to di culty in
determining which anomalies are relevant to security [27].
Code Pattern Recognition
In code pattern recognition, features are extracted from vulnerable code and used to identify
patterns [27]. A feature is simply a measurable property or characteristic; this term is
often used interchangeably with the term attribute. In this context, software metrics as
they are defined in the previous section are a subset of software features. Approaches to
extract features may include traditional static and dynamic analysis, code parsing, and text
mining [27].
After the features have been gathered they are transformed into vectors so that they may
be easily processed by learning algorithms. All individual vectors are combined to create
a single, n-dimensional vector of features called a feature vector, where = is equal to the
number of features. The feature vector provides a cohesive representation of each sample.
Finally, the same features are extracted from a new sample and a comparison is made to
determine whether the new sample shares patterns with the known vulnerable code. This
classification process is typically accomplished via supervised or unsupervised learning
using data or control flow representations of the source code. In this way, vulnerable code
pattern recognition techniques are somewhat similar to anomaly detection approaches. In
anomaly detection, the objective is to identify anomalies to normal use patterns, whereas, in
vulnerable code pattern recognition, the objective is to identify similar patterns.
Current vulnerable code pattern recognition techniques have a number of limitations, such
as: high false-positive rates, limited information about the types of vulnerable components
(e.g., a CWE or CVE association), and vague reporting (e.g., reporting that a source code
file contains a similar pattern to a known vulnerability, but not precisely where) [27].
In the next Section 2.3.5 we review a final category of vulnerability analysis– that is,
vulnerability identification techniques based on deep learning and neural networks.
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2.3.5 Deep Learning and Neural Networks
Neural networks and deep learning models have had widespread impacts on areas such as
image and speech recognition, information security, big data processing, cloud computing,
internet routing, and forensic science [127]. Researchers have also begun to apply neural
networks and deep learning techniques to software vulnerability identification and analysis. A
comprehensive survey of notable work in this area was published in 2020, by Lin, et al. [28].
In their survey, the authors review 19 vulnerability detection methods that leverage deep
neural networks published between 2013 and 2019. The authors partitioned the surveyed





Table 2.2 summarizes the results from the 2020 survey. Of the 19 works reviewed, 5 used
compiled binary samples to support their work, 2 used a mix of binary and source code
samples, and the remaining 12 leveraged source code samples. This (37%) is a significant
increase from the mere 8% of conventional machine learning and data mining research
that used binary samples, as discussed in Section 2.3.4. This di erence could be a result
of the nature of deep learning methods, which often does not require the user to manually
extract interesting features. In turn, the automation o ered by deep learning may decrease
the domain expertise required to analyze vulnerabilities in binary files.
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Figure 2.8. Granularity of work reviewed in Lin et al. survey. Of the 19


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From static to dynamic code analysis, conventional machine learning and data mining
to deep neural networks, vulnerability analysis techniques have had nearly 100 years to
evolve. Yet, there is no panacea for software vulnerabilities, as every tool and technique
continues to su er from at least one major limitation. For example, early static analysis
tools, such as Lint and Flawfinder are criticized for having low precision rates and minimal
semantic insights [69], [75]. Dynamic analysis techniques such as fuzzing, dynamic symbolic
execution, and taint analysis o er increased semantic insights, but are limited by issues
including complex memory management and the path explosion problem [19], [21], [79]–
[81], [88]. Machine learning-based vulnerability analysis techniques su er from dataset
imbalances, resource-constraints, and brittle classification di erences between vulnerable
and non-vulnerable code [27], [28], [137]
In an attempt to mitigate the limitations of individual techniques vulnerability researchers
have begun to combine techniques. For example, a team at UC Santa Barbara uses a
combination of fuzzing and symbolic execution in their tool, Driller [80]; Mayhem uses
symbolic execution techniques in conjunction with taint analysis and fuzzing [138]; and [139]
proposes another taint-based approach to fuzzing.
In isolation, researchers have explored the limitations corresponding to VATTs, however, to
date, there is no standard method to compare VATTs. Consumers and developers currently
make comparisons of VATTs by assessing their relative performances using internally
developed or publicly available vulnerability datasets [25]. Next, we’ll take a deeper look at
some of the datasets currently used to compare VATTs.
2.4 Existing Methods to Compare VATTs
2.4.1 Introduction
In this section, we examine a number of vulnerability datasets that can be used to compare
VATTs. Each dataset reviewed is publicly available, and contains test cases with at least one
known software vulnerability.
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2.4.2 Cyber Grand Challenge
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has sponsored multiple Grand
Challenges to spur innovation and push the boundaries of the state of the art in autonomous
research areas. From 2013 to 2016 DARPA sponsored a $54 million experiment called the
CGC. Similar to previous DARPA Grand Challenges, participants in the CGC were entirely
autonomous. On August 4, 2016, seven teams competed in the CGC Final Event (CFE). By
improving and combining semi-automated capabilities each team built a single autonomous
Cyber Reasoning System (CRS) capable of identifying, exploiting, and patching software
vulnerabilities [140].
After the final event, DARPA released the entire corpus of binaries that were used throughout
the Challenge to the public. The initial release of binaries was only compatible with the
custom CGC DARPA Experimental Cyber Research Evaluation Environment (DECREE)
Operating System (OS), but researchers at TrailofBits have since ported the binaries to
be compatible with common operating environments including Windows, Macintosh, and
Linux [141]. TrailofBits contends that in the absence of a true benchmark the extended CGC
corpus, dubbed CB-Multios, can be used to provide quantitative metrics for VATTs [141].
The CB-Multios corpus includes the source code for 243 test cases. Each test case was
written in C code, and is accompanied by the author’s description of the one or more known
vulnerabilities within that challenge in addition to the associated CWEs. Each test case is also
accompanied by a patch for the vulnerabilities. This allows users of the corpus to compile
the known vulnerable, and patched versions of the test cases. The CB-Multios corpus is
limited by the fact that it only contains synthetic, or engineered test cases. However, the
CB-Multios corpus was designed to approximate real-world software. The corpus is also
limited by the granularity at which vulnerabilities are labeled— at the file versus line or
function level. Known vulnerabilities in the CB-Multios corpus are labeled at the file level,
however, users can manually query the source code for the presence of ifdef PATCHED
which will reveal functions where known vulnerabilities reside.
Table 2.3. CB Multi-OS description
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
CB-Multios C 243 File 888
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2.4.3 Juliet C#, C/C++, and Juliet Java
The Juliet C#, C/C++ and Java test suites were developed by the National Security Agency
(NSA) Center for Assured Software (CAS) to assess the capabilities and limitations of
static analysis tools [142]. Each test case in the suite contains at least one known, synthetic,
security flaw. The latest version of the Juliet test suites contain over 100k individual test
cases. Criticisms of the Juliet test suite are that it includes non-exploitable bugs, and overly
simplistic or redundant source code [30], [137]. Table 2.4 summarizes the Juliet datasets.
Table 2.4. Juliet C#, C/C++ and Juliet Java descriptions
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
Juliet C# C# 28,942 Function 28,942
Juliet C/C++ C/C++ 64,099 Function 64,099
Juliet Java Java 28,881 Function 28,881
2.4.4 LAVA-M
The LAVA-M (Large-scale Automated Vulnerability Addition) dataset was developed by
researchers at New York University, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and Northeastern University.
The dataset contains a corpus of bu er overflow vulnerabilities that were originally developed
to evaluate the LAVA bug injection system. Specifically, the LAVA-M corpus is derived from
four copies of the GNU coreutils (v. 8.24) programs (10B464, <35BD<, D=8@, and |⌘>),
and contains a total of 2,265 synthetic vulnerabilities [25]. The bugs in the LAVA-M corpus
were injected into the real-world source code using the LAVA tool. While the LAVA-M
contains real-world code, it only contains C-based memory corruption vulnerabilities [25].
Table 2.5 summarizes the LAVA-M dataset.
Table 2.5. LAVA-M descriptions
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
LAVA M C 4 File 2,265
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2.4.5 OWASP Benchmark Project
The OWASP Benchmark was designed by OWASP to evaluate automated software vulner-
ability identification tools [29]. The test suite is presented as a web application, and each
test case contains at least one known synthetic Java vulnerability. The OWASP Benchmark
is unique in that it also includes a scorecard that describes the number of true and false
positives a tool reports, and uses a Youden index to generate a score for each tool [29]. The
OWASP Benchmark is limited by the fact that it only contains Java-related vulnerabilities.
Table 2.6 summarizes the OWASP Benchmark dataset.
Table 2.6. OWASP Benchmark descriptions
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
OWASP Benchmark Java 2,740 File 2,740
2.4.6 STONESOUP
The Securely Taking On New Executable Software of Uncertain Provenance (STONESOUP)
dataset was developed by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA),
and contains 7,770 known, synthetic vulnerabilities injected into 16 real-world C and Java
programs. Each vulnerability is associated with a known CWE. Table 2.7 summarizes the
STONESOUP dataset.
Table 2.7. STONESOUP descriptions
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
STONESOUP C & Java 16 File 7,770
2.4.7 FLVD
The Function-level Vulnerability Dataset (FLVD) contains 15K non-vulnerable and 118
vulnerable real-world C-functions [137]. Vulnerabilities in this dataset were gathered using
published CVE data and labeled using di ng. Each function is saved as an individual .c
file, consequently, the test cases are not able to be compiled. Table 2.8 summarizes the
Function-level Vulnerability Dataset.
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Table 2.8. FLVD dataset
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
FLVD C 15,426 Function 118
2.4.8 VDISC
The Draper VDISC dataset contains the source code for 1.27M functions mined from open
source software [45]. Static analysis was used to confirm the location of each vulnerability.
The functions are separated and labeled as vulnerable or not vulnerable. The test cases are
not able to be compiled. Table 2.9 summarizes the VDISC Dataset.
Table 2.9. VDISC dataset
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
VDISC C 1.27M Function Unknown
2.4.9 LinuxFlaw
The LinuxFlaw dataset [143] contains 368 real-world memory error Linux vulnerabilities.
The complete source code for each vulnerability is provided, so each test case is able to be
compiled. Table 2.10 summarizes the LinuxFlaw Dataset.
Table 2.10. LinuxFlaw dataset
Dataset Language Total Samples Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
LinuxFlaw C 368 File 368
2.4.10 Discussion
In this Section we reviewed eight open source datasets that can be used to assess vulnerability
analysis tools. Each dataset contains at least one synthetic or real-world vulnerability. In
addition to these datasets, Ferenc et al. provide metrics and labels for 12,125 non-vulnerable
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and 1,496 vulnerable JavaScript functions [144]. Unlike the previous datasets, [144] does
not contain any actual code, however, a link to the full repository associated with each
vulnerability is provided. We made no attempt to validate these links were active.
Table 2.11 provides a high level summary of the datasets we reviewed.
Table 2.11. Open source vulnerability datasets.
Open source vulnerability datasets. Code types: real-world (RW), Synthetic (S), and Hybrid
Synthetic (HS). Compilable: Yes (Y), No (N)
Dataset Language Type Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities Compilable
CB-Multios C HS File 888 Y
Juliet C# C# S Function 28,942 Y
Juliet C/C++ C/C++ S Function 64,099 Y
Juliet Java Java S Function 28,881 Y
LAVA M C HS File 2,265 Y
OWASP Benchmark Java S File 2,740 Y
STONESOUP C & Java HS File 7,770 Y
FLVD C RW Function 118 N
VDISC C RW Function n/a N
LinuxFlaw C RW File 368 Y
ferenc JavaScript RW Function 1,496 N
Collectively, these datasets contain over 150K known vulnerabilities and bugs. While the
vulnerabilities in some datasets are labeled at the file level, others are labeled at the function
level. Providing labels at a finer granularity, e.g., functions or even lines of code, allows for a
more insightful and quantitative assessment of the performance of di erent vulnerability
identification techniques [137]. Additionally, these datasets provide a collection of pure
synthetic, hybrid-synthetic, and real-world code. Synthetic vulnerabilities are sometimes
criticized for being overly simplistic and not representative of vulnerabilities in the real-world,
while some of the real-world repositories are limited because they provide source code that
cannot be compiled. Many of these datasets have been shown to provide disproportionate
number of vulnerability types compared to vulnerability instances that have occurred in the
wild in the past decade [22].
Perhaps as a result of these limitations, the community has yet to accept a single dataset or
repository as a benchmark for VATTs. Numerous researchers have stressed that we are in
need of a standard benchmark to quantitatively assess the e cacy of VATTs [22], [25], [27],
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[28]. However, a framework for such a benchmark has yet to be defined.
2.5 Feature Extraction
In Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 we reviewed machine learning, deep learning, and data mining
techniques used to support vulnerability analysis. In most of the techniques reviewed an
essential step in the process is the extraction of one or more features from a sample. As
specified in Section 2.3.4, a feature is a measurable property or characteristic of a program.
We use this term interchangeably with attribute. Thus, we refer to tools (techniques,
frameworks, etc.) that can be used to extract one or more features from a program as feature
extraction tools. The proposed work will be open sourced, so we specifically examine
open source feature extraction tools. Additionally, the proposed work extracts features from
compiled code, so we emphasize open source feature extraction tools that extract features
from binary files. Finally we focus on tools that are used to extract one or more features in
support of vulnerability analysis.
We partition the reviewed feature extraction tools into two categories:
1. those that extract one feature (i.e., single feature extraction tools)
2. those that extract more than one feature (i.e., multiple features extraction tools)
To clarify, a single feature extraction tool can be used to extract one feature from a file. This
could include a feature such as: strings, external function calls, and instruction sequences. A
multiple features extraction tool would extract more than one feature, such as strings and
external function calls, or complexity, entropy, and instruction sequences, etc.
2.5.1 Single Feature Extraction Tools
In this Section we review a number of open source tools that can be used to extract a single
feature from a compiled code.
Li et al. [31] proposed the use of code gadgets, i.e., a number of semantically related lines of
source code. The code gadgets are transformed into vectors which are then used to predict
vulnerabilities using BLSTM. The authors specifically evaluated vulnerabilities related to
stack-based bu er overflows (CWE-121). Ultimately, their design was published as a deep
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learning-based vulnerability detection system called, VulDeePecker. VulDeePecker can be
used to extract code gadgets from source code.
Lee et al. [30] proposed Instruction2vec which can be used to create a vector representation
of input using deep learning. Instruction2vec was designed to predict vulnerable functions in
binary files using a labeled test suite to train a learning model. The original Instruction2vec
model was trained using test cases from the Juliet dataset [142] that are related to stack-based
bu er overflow (CWE-121) vulnerabilities. Instruction2vec is used to identify similarities
between individual instructions.
The Maximal Divergence Sequential Auto-Encoder was proposed by [44], and leverages the
deep learning techniques, Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE) and one-hot encoding to identify
vulnerabilities in binary code. The authors represent each binary as a sequence of machine
instructions, then apply VAE to encourage the samples to be maximally divergent. Similar
to [30], Maximal Divergence Sequential Auto-Encoder is based on the vector representation
for individual instructions.
Asm2Vec is based on the Doc2Vec model [145], and uses control-flow information to provide
an assembly code representation learning model [146]. Users can provide pre-parsed basic
blocks of assembly code or raw assembly code to Asm2Vec for processing. In this regard,
Asm2Vec does not explicitly extract features from compiled binaries, however, Asm2Vec can
parse raw assembly code into basic blocks.
2.5.2 Multiple Features Extraction Tools
In addition to single feature extraction tools, we also identified one tool that can be used to
extract multiple features from compiled code, VDiscover.
VDiscover applies static and dynamic information to extract features from assembly code.
Specifically, the structure of the code is approximated using static analysis to extract calls
made to the standard C library. Dynamic analysis is then used to extract the execution
trace for the program including the arguments for the function calls and the final state of
the process if applicable [40]. Finally, a representation model (i.e., Word2Vec) is used to
transform the extracted features into a feature vector2.
2See Chapter 4 for a more detailed description of Word2Vec
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2.5.3 Discussion
In this Section we reviewed open source tools that can be used to extract one or more features
from binary files in support of vulnerability analysis. The majority of tools including [30],
[31], [44], [146] extract a single feature from binary samples. VDiscover can be used to
extract multiple features, however, VDiscover is only compatible with C source code. Many
of the reviewed feature extraction tools only look at a single vulnerability type. We observe
that all of these tools were made public within the past five years, indicating that this is a
relevant and growing body of research. The work presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation
mitigates many of the limitations presented by current feature extraction tools, including the
extraction of numerous features from binary files, and the compatibility with an array of
vulnerability types.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we set the stage for the remainder of our research. We provided background
relevant to each the development of a framework for BVATT, and a means to extract
common features from binary samples in support of machine learning and data mining based
vulnerability research.
Looking forward, in Chapter 3 we’ll provide a framework, that upon implementation allows
users to systematically compare the performance of one VATT versus another in a manner
that is repeatable, reproducible, fair, verifiable, and relevant. Then, in Chapter 4 we’ll provide
the BiSECT tool. BiSECT allows users to succinctly extract, clean, and transform common




A Framework for the Benchmark for Vulnerability
Analysis Tools and Techniques (BVATT)
[...] when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in
numbers, you know something about it; but when you can not measure it, when
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and
unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely,
in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.
Lord Kelvin, Electrical Units of Measurement.
3.1 Introduction
In 1883, Lord Kelvin called for a “numerical reckoning” in popular sciences [147]. Kelvin
urged that without taking steps towards quantitative measurement we cannot objectively
compare the electromagnetic resistance of two coils, or the hardness of a diamond to that
of a ruby. The concept of quantitative measurement was hardly novel in the 1800s. Nearly
two centuries prior, in 1687, Sir Isaac Newton published, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia
Mathematica, a groundbreaking work that translated qualitative statements about the physical
world into a mathematically based science [148]. These principles provide the fundamental
building blocks that allow us to compare the velocity of two objects, and design satellites
that successfully orbit celestial bodies.
In computer science, benchmarking suites allow us to objectively and repeatedly compare
one multiprocessor design to another, and standard datasets are used to quantitatively assess
the relative performance of di erent algorithms. We can state with confidence that a grammar
is ambiguous, and consistently apply the pumping lemma to show that a language is not
regular. These building blocks allow us to objectively compare programming languages
and architect complex computing systems. In security, databases like CVE and SARD use a
consistent syntax and reporting structure for cataloging vulnerabilities [24], [56]. Uniformity
in these areas provides a basis for experimentation based on quantitative measurement. Yet,
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the facet of security research that focuses on the comparison of VATTs seems to lack the
quantitative element exhibited by its peers.
The security community relies on VATTs to support software vulnerability analysis processes.
In Chapter 2 we reviewed several vulnerability analysis techniques that we organized into
four logical categories: static analysis, dynamic analysis, machine learning and data mining,
and finally, techniques using deep learning and neural networks. We discussed strengths and
weaknesses of each technique, and provided an overview of methods to compare the relative
e cacy of VATTs.
While there are a few useful resources [24]–[26], a standard benchmark to assess the relative
e cacy of VATTs has yet to be accepted by the community. Consequently, we have no
comparative metrics of the types of vulnerabilities each tool and technique can or cannot find,
how quickly they can do so, or the number of false positives they report. When a consumer
wants to employ a VATT, they have no standard method of comparing the alternatives to
determine which is the optimal choice for their use case. When a developer wants to modify
an existing VATT, or enter the market with a new one, no standard benchmark is available to
compare their VATT against existing ones. In the absence of such a benchmark, consumers
and developers compare vulnerability analysis tools and techniques in a disjointed fashion.
This can result in misinformation, subjectivity, redundancy, and inconsistency. One common
comparison approach is to assess the relative performance of di erent tools and techniques
using a collection of test cases containing known vulnerabilities. These test cases are often
organized into public or proprietary datasets.
Numerous researchers have stressed that we are in need of a standard benchmark to
quantitatively assess the e cacy of VATTs [22], [25], [27], [28]. In this Chapter we establish
a framework for such a benchmark, which we dub, BVATT. We first summarize a few
open source datasets, and their corresponding limitations (also summarized in Chapter
2). This is followed by a discussion of lessons learned from well established benchmarks
across multiple domains— from these lessons we surmise that a good benchmark should
be repeatable, reproducible, fair, verifiable, and relevant. These five characteristics become
the basic building blocks upon which we develop the framework for BVATT. Finally, we
extensively investigate what it would require to create a benchmark that is representative
of reality (i.e., relevant). To accomplish this, we examine methods to leverage test cases
52
from existing datasets, and create a benchmark that is representative of weakness types and
vulnerability instances as they occur in the wild. Ultimately, this work led us to create the
binary feature extraction tool, BiSECT. BiSECT is briefly introduced at the conclusion of
this chapter, and discussed extensively in Chapter 4.
To summarize, in Chapter 3 we make the following contributions:
1. Synthesize 839 CWEs with over 75,000 CVEs to determine the relative proportions
of vulnerability instances and weakness types in the wild
2. Analyze four popular software vulnerability datasets, and show that none accurately
represents vulnerability instances and weakness types as they occur in the wild
3. Provide a framework for a benchmark for vulnerability analysis tools and techniques
(BVATT)
3.1.1 Motivation and Chapter Outline
Hundreds of thousands of publicly available test cases containing known software flaws and
vulnerabilities have been aggregated into datasets, each with its own structure, supported
languages, and reporting method. Databases such as the SARD attempt to inject order by
providing a consolidated repository of vulnerability datasets and test cases [24]. Unfortunately,
even the SARD, which contains 40 datasets and over 170K test cases, is not exhaustive— it
excludes well known datasets such as the CGC Corpus [26], LAVA-M [25], and OWASP
Benchmark Project [29].
Table 3.1 provides a high level overview of the source code language and number of known
vulnerabilities in seven open source datasets, the granularity of the datasets vulnerability
labels is also included in the table. Additional information about each dataset is provided in
Chapter 2. Collectively, these datasets contain over 135K synthetic-known vulnerabilities
and bugs.
Limitations of Current Datasets
These datasets su er from several limitations. We demonstrate that many contain an
unrealistic representation of weakness types, i.e., CWE entries, when compared to known
vulnerability instances in the wild, i.e., accepted CVE entries [22]. Consequently, even if a
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Table 3.1. Combined descriptions of seven open source vulnerability datasets
Dataset Language Total Programs Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
CB-Multios C 243 File 888
Juliet C# C# 28,942 Function 28,942
Juliet C/C++ C/C++ 64,099 Function 64,099
Juliet Java Java 28,881 Function 28,881
LAVA M C 4 File 2,265
OWASP Benchmark Java 2,740 File 2,740
STONESOUP C & Java 16 File 7,770
VATT was assessed using all 170K of the SARD test cases, the results would still not reflect
reality. This limitation is discussed extensively in Section 3.3.5.
While the vulnerabilities in some datasets are labeled at the file level, others, specifically
those included in the Juliet corpus are labeled at the function level. Labeling vulnerabilities
with a finer granularity, e.g., function versus file level, allows for a more insightful and
quantitative assessment of the performance of di erent VATTs [27], [28], [30], [31]
Additionally, while some of the datasets include real-world code (e.g., LAVA M, and
STONESOUP), all of the vulnerabilities within each of these datasets are entirely synthetic.
Synthetic vulnerabilities are sometimes criticized for being overly simplistic and not
representative of vulnerabilities in the real-world [27], [28].
In addition to open source datasets, some researchers have created custom datasets to
quantify the performance of VATTs. There are several limitations to using custom-developed
datasets [25], [27], [28]:
1. Custom datasets are often proprietary, and di cult for other researchers to reproduce
and verify
2. It is di cult to discern whether test cases were cherry picked to highlight the strengths
(and minimize the weaknesses) of a particular tool or technique
3. Vulnerabilities may be labeled at a di erent granularity, making it di cult to combine
datasets
The limitations of existing datasets are perhaps the reason that none has been accepted as the
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standard benchmark for VATTs. Numerous researchers have stressed that we are in need of a
standard benchmark to quantitatively assess the e cacy of VATTs, but even a framework for
such a benchmark has yet to be established.
Based on the limitations of existing datasets, and the absence of a community-accepted
benchmark we determined that the community is in need of an overarching framework to
guide the implementation of BVATT. The framework for BVATT should include both the
core characteristics of the benchmark, and metrics that can be used to quantitatively compare
VATTs.
In Section 3.1.2 we explore lessons learned from computing-related benchmarks, which are
used as the foundation for BVATT.
3.1.2 Benchmarks
In the 1960s there was a significant increase in the number of computer vendors and variety
of system configurations. Benchmark problems became a popular method to compare the
speed with which computers accomplished basic data processing functions [149]. Benchmark
problems are not strictly bound to assessing computing speed though. In the past decade
numerous benchmarks have been published to quantify the e cacy of machine learning and
deep learning models. In 2009, the publication of the ImageNet benchmark led to noteworthy
developments in computer vision, advances in deep convolutional networks, and ultimately
stimulated collaborations among the community [150]. In 2018, MoleculeNet was published
and has had similar a ects in molecular machine learning research [151].
Benchmarks have a long history in computing, and have had multiple e ects on the
community across various sub-domains. Commonly, benchmark problems are used to
quantify the performance di erences between tools or techniques [149], but they can also
encourage innovation, competition, and collaboration [150], [151]. Our hope is that by
establishing the framework for BVATT, we can have a similar impact on the vulnerability
analysis community. To this end, we first explore desirable characteristics for a benchmark
proposed by a number of researchers [27], [28], [152]–[155]. From these we detail the
following five fundamental characteristics for BVATT:
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• Repeatable The same results should be consistently achieved when the benchmark is
run with an identical tool under identical conditions
• Reproducible The benchmark results should be independently achievable
• Fair The benchmark should not be partial to any particular tool or technique
• Verifiable There should be confidence that benchmark results are accurate
• Relevant The benchmark problems should be representative of reality
In Section 3.3 we detail each of these characteristics for BVATT. In Section 3.2 we examine
another key component for BVATT, scoring.
3.2 BVATT Scoring
A primary goal of most VATTs is to correctly identify code as vulnerable or not-vulnerable.
In this way, these VATTs can be considered binary classifiers [156]. BVATT can leverage
common metrics for binary classification to compare the e cacy of di erent VATTs that
share this goal. The fundamental components for these metrics are included in a standard LxL
confusion matrix, which shows the predicted and actual classifications, where L is the number
of labels [157]. In a binary classification scenario all possible outcomes are represented in
a 2x2 matrix, and include: True Positive (TP), False Positive FP, True Negative (TN), and
False Negatives (FN), where:
• True Positive (TP): Actual positive, p0, predicted as positive, p.
• False Positive (FP): Actual negative, n0, predicted as p.
• True Negative (TN): n0 predicted as negative, n.
• False Negative (FN): p0 predicted as n
Table 3.2 shows a confusion matrix for binary classification scenarios.
[156] examined 14 metrics that can be used to compare the e cacy of vulnerability detection
tools in di erent binary classification scenarios. The authors analyze and score each metric
based on the following criteria: how understandable the metric and its formula are to
non-statisticians, how meaningful the metric is to general users, how scalable and cheap the
metric is to gather, whether both TP and FP are measured, how much emphasis is placed
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on TPs, and how compatible the metric is with di erent tools and small data sets3. They
conclude that the optimal metrics to compare vulnerability detection tools include: recall,
precision, false detection rate, f-measure, Fx-score, and false-positive rate [156]. The formula
and description corresponding to each of these metrics is provided in Table 3.3.
Antunes and Vieira demonstrated that di erent metrics may be more or less suited to
certain vulnerability identification scenarios [156]. For example, in a business-critical
application scenario where the goal is to identify the VATT that detects the highest number
of vulnerabilities, recall is the optimal metric. However, in a best-e ort scenario where the
goal is to identify the VATT that detects the highest number of vulnerabilities while reporting
the lowest number of false positives, the f-measure is the optimal metric. To support an array
of use cases, we propose that BVATT report each of these metrics, in addition to the values
reported in the confusion matrix, for each VATT run against the benchmark.
BVATT should also report the metrics by type of vulnerability. In order to accomplish this,
each vulnerability in BVATT must be labeled with an associated vulnerability type such as
the CWE-ID. Reporting the metrics at this granularity will enable users of the benchmark to
determine the e cacy of VATTs when tasked with identifying vulnerabilities of a particular
type. BVATT should provide each of these metrics as a final scorecard in an easily parsed
3The RCCR (repeatable, consistent, comparable ratio) for each metric is also reported. However, each
metric received an identical score of 2 in this category, thus the influence of the RCCR on the final score is
negated. We exclude the RCCR from our review
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)%+ # Proportion of positive cases correctly clas-
sified as positive (aka true positive rate)
Precision )%)%+ % Proportion of classified positive cases that
are correctly classified (aka true positive
accuracy)



















 %+)# Ratio of negatives incorrectly classified
as positives (aka fall-out)
format, such as a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) or comma-separated values (CSV) file.
3.2.1 Scoring Example Implementation
An example scorecard is provided in Figure 3.1. In this hypothetical example, a VATT was
tested against 100 vulnerable (denoted by ’P’) and 100 not-vulnerable (denoted by ’N’) test
cases for 5 CWEs, for a total of 1K test cases. The scores for this VATT were high for some
CWEs (e.g., 664 and 691), but low for others (e.g., 682).
Figure 3.1. Example scorecard for a VATT run against BVATT
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This scorecard was generated using a CSV and Python code. To support future BVATT
maintainers, our score card generation source code has been made publicly available via
GitHub4. As VATTs continue to evolve, so too may the metrics to quantify the e cacy of
those VATTs in di erent scenarios. For this reason, in addition to the 6 metrics proposed for
BVATT (summarized in Table 3.3), the GitHub repository also contains the code to calculate
all 14 metrics from [156] to compare the e cacy of VATTs.
3.3 BVATT Characteristics
In this section we examine what is required to achieve the characteristics outlined in Section
3.1.2, and establish a BVATT that is repeatable, reproducible, fair, verifiable, and relevant.
3.3.1 Repeatable
The same results should be consistently achieved when repeating an identical experiment.
For example, when evaluating the same version of a VATT against the exact same set of
benchmark problems in the exact same environment the same metrics (i.e., results) should
be produced. BVATT should be reliable, and metrics produced using BVATT should be
repeatable. Ensuring reliability not only gives confidence that results produced by BVATT
are stable, but it also provides a baseline for future experimentation and the evaluation of
new ideas using BVATT [158]. To this end, we propose a more stringent evaluation criteria
for repeatability that includes statistical measurements.
Test Retest Reliability
The extent to which measurements can be repeated is often referred to as test-retest reliability
(also called internal consistency) [159]. Given the same VATT, the metrics for tests )1
and )2 are said to be correlated. This correlation has many di erent names including the
test-retest-reliability coe cient, Intraclass Correlation Coe cient (ICC), coe cient of
stability, and sometimes simply the reliability score [159], [160]. The closer the scores are
between )1 and )2, the more reliable the test measure is, and the higher the reliability score
will be. If the metrics from )1 and )2 are perfectly correlated, then there is no measurement
error, and the reliability will be equal to 1. Conversely, a reliability score of 0 indicates that
4https://github.com/Kayla0x41/BVATT/tree/master/scorecard
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there is high measurement error. In this context, reliability accounts for the following [159],
[160]:
• consistency of a test or measurement,
• the distinguishability of individual measurements,
• and the signal-to-noise ratio in the data
We propose the use of standard statistical methods to ensure that BVATT achieves test-retest
reliability. In the following section we explore the use of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
measurements to quantify reliability between test runs.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Reliability can be quantified using variance in the data. Ronald Fisher first introduced the
term variance in 1918, which he described as the square of the standard deviation of the
data [161]. In 1925, Fisher expanded his original concept to include the analysis of variance
or ANOVA [162]. ANOVA is used to identify statistical di erences among the means, and
ultimately to identify relationships and correlations between data. There are several types of
ANOVA, but one type, the repeated-measures ANOVA (sometimes called the within-subjects
ANOVA or ANOVA for correlated samples) is uniquely suited to identify statistical di erences
for related, non-independent groups. In this way, the repeated-measures ANOVA is the
optimal ANOVA for our use case, as we aim to quantify reliability between test runs for the
same VATT.
The repeated-measures ANOVA is statistically equivalent to a paired T-test with repeated
measures– the only caveat being that in the paired T-test a maximum of two measurements
may be compared, whereas there is no limit in repeated-measures ANOVA. A repeated-
measures, paired T-test will su ce for our use case as it will allow us to guarantee the
reliability of BVATT metrics between two test runs. There are two assumptions in a paired
T-test: first, each test run is assumed to have an equal sample size, and second, the variance
is assumed to be equal between test runs.
To summarize, both the paired T-test and repeated-measures ANOVA can be used when the
same subject (i.e., VATT) is measured more than once for each experimental condition (i.e.,
test case). Using the repeated-measures paired T-test we can quickly verify the reliability of
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experiments run using BVATT.
















Where = is equal to the number of test cases.
We provide an example implementation in Section 3.3.1 to illustrate the power and conve-
nience of using this method to ensure metrics produced by BVATT are reliable.
Paired T-Test Example Implementation
In the following example we consider a VATT, + ))1, and two test runs, Test 1 ()1)
and Test 2 ()2). In )1, + ))1 is run against 1,000 test cases spanning 5 CWEs. Of these
test cases, 500 contain 1 known vulnerability, and the remaining 500 contain the patched
(i.e., non-vulnerable) version of the vulnerable file. The metrics from this experiment are
summarized in Column “Test1” in Figure 3.2. A value of “True” indicates that either a TP or
TN was recorded, while a value of “False” indicates that the VATT reported either a FP or
FN. Then, we repeat the exact experiment, in the same environment, using + ))1 and the
same test cases. The metrics from this experiment are summarized in Column “Test2” in
Figure 3.2. The results from )1 and )2 are identical, the paired T-test from the paired T-test
are reported as “nan”, as seen in Figure 3.3.
Now, let’s say we want to improve the performance of + ))1, so we manipulate various
independent variables. For example, we could increase the duration of the test allowing
+ ))1 more time to correctly identify vulnerabilities. After making this change we rerun
the experiment, and record the results from this test in Table )3.
Using the paired T-test, we can easily assess the statistical impact of the changes made
between the tests, )1 and )2, and the test after the modifications, )3. The paired T-test
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hypothesizes that the populations have identical variances by default, and produces a p-value.
If the p-value is larger than a predetermined threshold (typically, 0.05 or 0.1) then the
hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the average score must be identical. However, if the
p-value is smaller than the threshold, then the hypothesis can be rejected, and it can be
stated that our modifications indeed had an impact on the results. To calculate the repeated
measures paired T-test we use the open source Python package, SciPy [163]. Figure 3.4
shows the results from the paired T-test on )1 and )3. In this example, ? = 0.07, thus we
reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the modifications to the environment had a
statistical impact on the benchmark results.
Figure 3.2. Sample results from Test1 ()1) and Test2 ()2), where + ))1
was run against an identical set of 1K test cases
The paired T-test provides a simple and e ective means to ensure that results generated
by BVATT are reliable. To support future BVATT maintainers, our code Jupyter notebook
implementing the paired T-test has been made publicly available via GitHub5.
5https://github.com/Kayla0x41/BVATT/tree/master/scorecard
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Figure 3.3. Paired T-test for identical repeated measures ()1 and )2) example
calculation using SciPy
Figure 3.4. Paired T-test for different repeated measures ()1 and )3) example
calculation using SciPy
3.3.2 Reproducible
Reproducibility refers to the independent confirmation of a scientific hypothesis through
reproduction by an independent party [164]. In the context of BVATT, reproducibility
means that independent parties should be able to reproduce the results achieved by the
benchmark. Reproducibility enables independent users of BVATT to replicate results, verify
how results may change using di erent parameters, and re-use or extend experiments [165].
Reproducibility is made up of two primary components [165]:
1. a full description of the experiment including the data used and experiment specification
(e.g., steps, duration, underlying code needed, and environment)
2. a complete package of the components, so that it may be executed in various operating
environments
If included in BVATT, the first component would provide a step-by-step guide to enables users
to replicate the experiment using the second component. To achieve the second component
BVATT should be implemented and shared as a Docker container, or other similar technology.
A Docker container is a virtual container that includes all of the requisite code, runtime
information, dependencies, system tools, libraries, settings, etc. needed for a software to
run [166]. Using a Docker container will ensure that users are able to download and use
BVATT in numerous operating environments.
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3.3.3 Verifiable
Verifiability provides confidence that benchmark results are accurate. In order to achieve
verifiability the method to identify each vulnerability in the benchmark should be documented.
Verifiability in synthetic vulnerability datasets is often accomplished via an author provided
description of the vulnerability [29], [142]. Researchers have proposed a number of methods
to verify vulnerabilities in real-world code [137], [167]. In the next section we provide an
example method to identify vulnerabilities in original and patched executables using binary
di ng.
Vulnerability labeling using di s
One technique to identify vulnerabilities in real-world repositories is to di  the original
and patched versions of source code files [137], [167]. During the di  the original function
corresponding to any function modified during a patch is deemed vulnerable (the updated
function is deemed not vulnerable). We extend this approach and develop a technique to
identify vulnerabilities in original and patched executables using binary di ng.
Specifically, we wrote a Python script to leverage the Ghidra, BinExport, and BinDi  APIs,
and identify all functions that were modified during a patch [168], [169]. By using the
APIs instead of the GUI interface, this method provides the added benefit of batch analysis.
Like [137], [167] we assume that if a function was modified during the patch process then
the original function was vulnerable. Furthermore, if a function was not involved in any
patches, then it is labeled as ‘unchanged’. We use unchanged instead of ‘not vulnerable‘ for
these functions, as we cannot assume that they do not contain an undiscovered vulnerability.
The high level di ng process is depicted in Figure 3.5.
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we provide an example using the CB-Multios
corpus, in which we identify and label 888 vulnerable functions, and 136,842 non-vulnerable
and unchanged functions [141]. In this corpus, the author of each Challenge Binary (CB)
provided a detailed description of the known vulnerabilities included in the sample, including
an associated CWE classification [140], [141]. Using GCC on an Ubuntu virtual machine,
we compiled 285 known vulnerable test cases or samples from the TrailofBits CB-Multios
repository, and 285 patched versions of the samples. Known vulnerabilities in the CB-Multios
corpus are labeled at the file level, however, users can manually query the source code for the
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presence of ifdef PATCHED which will reveal functions that contain known vulnerabilities.
For example, the author of the CB called, BitBlaster, indicates that the test case contains
vulnerabilities related to CWE-284, Access of Uninitialized Pointer and CWE-476, Null
Pointer Dereference. To increase the granularity of the vulnerability labels and reduce the
manual e ort required to label the functions we leveraged the di erences between the patched
and original samples. For reference, it took less than 5 minutes to identify and label all 137K
functions as vulnerable or not vulnerable using the proposed technique.
Figure 3.5. High level process to label functions in compiled code as vulnerable
or not vulnerable
While the BinExport and BinDi  plugins and associated APIs are well documented for IDA
Pro [169], there is limited information available on using the APIs with Ghidra. We have
made our code publicly available on GitHub, and provide a Jupyter Notebook that details
our full workflow [170].
3.3.4 Fair
In order for BVATT to be fair, that is, not partial to any particular tool or technique, the test
cases should be selected independently of any specific VATT. We discuss test case selection
methods extensively in Section 3.3.5.
3.3.5 BVATT Relevance
The results from a benchmark test can only be as good as the benchmarks
themselves. If the benchmarks are not representative, the results could prove
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more harmful than no benchmark at all. [149]
Determining the relevance of problems within a benchmark can involve a number of elements.
Kistowski states that from a design perspective relevance involves two dimensions: the
breadth of the benchmark’s applicability, and the degree to which benchmark problems are
relevant in each area of interest [152]. Karl Huppler identifies seven characteristics that
determine whether a benchmark problem is relevant. Each problem in a benchmark [154]:
1. must provide a meaningful and understandable metric
2. should stress software features in a way that is similar to customer applications
3. should exercise hardware systems in a way that is similar to customer applications
4. must have longevity
5. must have broad applicability
6. should not misrepresent itself
7. has a target audience that wants the information
John Henning states that benchmark suites should be derived from real-world applications so
that designers and consumers can make decisions on the basis of realistic workloads [153]. In
order to be relevant benchmark problems should be closely connected to, and representative
of reality. In 1965, Joslin discussed the keys to meaningful computer evaluations. He states,
“The question of what constitutes good benchmark problems can be answered in one word—
representativeness” [171].
In the context of BVATT, we summarize relevance as follows: the suite of benchmark
problems included in BVATT should be representative of the types of vulnerabilities
prevalent in the real-world. In the remainder of this Section, we examine precisely how
reality and representativeness can be determined.
Reality
The industry standard for vulnerabilities in the real-world is provided by the CVE. The CVE
is a dictionary of publicly known vulnerability and exposure instances [6]. Each entry in the
dictionary describes an instance of a vulnerability, and includes metadata such as a unique
identifier (CVE ID), description of the vulnerability, and where applicable, a corresponding
66
CWE entry6.
From 1999 to May 2020 the CVE published 160, 544 known vulnerabilities and exposures [6].
To date, the greatest number, 21, 598, of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and exposures
was reported by the CVE in 2018. Over half, 93, 056, of all CVE entries ever recorded,
excluding 2020, were published between 2014 to 2019 [6]. Of these, 75, 535 CVEs were
accepted7 by the community— this provides a substantial collection of real vulnerability
instances. Figure 3.6 shows the sum of CVEs by year published from 1999 to 2020. The
blocks are organized by size, and the size of each block in the figure is proportional to the
number of CVEs published in that year. For example, the greatest number of vulnerabilities
was published in 2018 (21.60K vulnerabilities).
Figure 3.6. Sum of CVE (all statuses) by year since 1999. The size of each
block is proportional to the number of CVEs published in that year.
Alone, the CVE provides a dictionary of real and relevant vulnerability instances, however,
the CVE does not categorize vulnerabilities by their associated weakness type. To mitigate
this deficiency, we use the known correlation between CVE and CWEs to classify each
6Many CVE entries published prior to the development of the CWE (2006) do not include a CWE ID
7A CVE record is an item in the CVE list. Not all CVEs will be ’accepted’. Some may be labeled as
’rejected’, however they still show up in the overall CVE listing. A CVE may be rejected if it is discovered to
be a duplicate, withdrawn by the original requester, or was incorrectly assigned [6]
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CVE by its type. What the CVE provides for vulnerability instances, the CWE provides for
weakness types. The CWE is a repository of over 1200 hardware and software weaknesses,
and provides a common language, identifier, and definition for each weakness type referenced.
CWE entries are organized into a number of views to support di erent objectives. We use
view CWE-1000, Research Concepts, which includes a hierarchy of 839 CWE entries. Each
CWE in the hierarchy is associated with one of the following abstraction types [172]:
• Pillar Weaknesses that are described in the most abstract fashion (10 CWEs).
• Class Abstract weakness, typically independent of any specific language or technology
(96 CWEs).
• Base A more specific type of weakness (441 CWEs).
• Variant A weakness that is described at a very low level of detail, typically limited to
a specific language or technology (285 CWEs).
• Composite A set of weaknesses that must all be present simultaneously in order to
produce an exploitable vulnerability (7 CWEs).
Using the abstraction types the weakness hierarchy presented by view CWE-1000 can be
organized into ten rooted trees. A rooted tree is a tree with a single root vertex that is
distinguished from all others. Each pillar in the hierarchy is the root node of a rooted tree.
Using BeautifulSoup [173], Pandas [174], and D3 [175] we crawled over 1000 individual
pages on the CWE website to create and visualize the tree data structures for each of the
ten CWE Pillars. This approach allows us to view the most up-to-date information on
CWE relationships and hierarchies. Figure 3.7 shows the overall process to crawl, extract,
manipulate, and visualize the CVE and CWE data.
Then, by using CWE-1000 as the root node of a tree we can create a single rooted tree that
includes every CWE in the CWE-1000 view. Figure 3.8 depicts the ten CWE pillars and
their 839 children as a hierarchical radial dendrogram with root node CWE-1000.
Of the 75,535 community-accepted CVEs published from 2014-2019, 55,128 have an
associated CWE. By using the correlations between CVEs and CWEs we classify each
of the vulnerability instances (i.e., CVEs) by their weakness type (i.e., CWE). Figure 3.9
shows the sum of known vulnerability instances published from 2014-2019, by type. This
visualization shows the relative proportions of CWE in the real-world. The enclosing circles
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Figure 3.7. The high-level process to crawl, extract, manipulate, and visualize
CVE and CWE data
show the cumulative size of each of the ten CWE pillars (i.e., subtrees), while maintaining
relationship and hierarchical data. The exterior circle represents root node, CWE-1000.
We repeat this process using four popular vulnerability datasets: Juliet C/C++ (Juliet (C)),
Juliet Java (Juliet (J)), the OWASP Benchmark (OWASP Ben.), and the CGC Corpus (CGC).
Figure 3.10 shows the sum of vulnerability instances (CVE ID) by type (CWE ID) from
2014-2019 (a), and includes a sum of test cases by type in each dataset (b-e) for comparison.
These Sunburst diagrams illustrate the stark contrast between the types of weaknesses in the
wild, and those in current vulnerability datasets.
Like the CVE, each test case in the reviewed datasets has a corresponding CWE ID that
can be traced to a pillar node. Table 3.4 shows the relative percentages of test cases in each
pillar by vulnerability dataset. It shows that none of the vulnerability datasets accurately
reflects vulnerabilities as they have occurred in the real-world, i.e., CVEs from 2014-2019.
Conversely, we propose a method in Section 3.3.5 to preserve the real proportions of
vulnerabilities and weakness types, and ensure that BVATT is representative of reality.
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Figure 3.8. CWE view 1000 depicted as a hierarchical radial dendrogram
Representativeness
By leveraging the relationship between CVE and CWEs we can identify a candidate
repository of 55, 128 real vulnerabilities that include corresponding type information. From
this repository, we could create one benchmark problem for each vulnerability instance,
however, to conserve time, limited resources, and availability we identify a subset of
vulnerabilities that is representative of the larger set.
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Figure 3.9. Sum of vulnerability instances (CVE) by type (CWE) from 2014-
2019
When resources are constrained statisticians take samples of the data to make quantitative
inferences about a larger population [176]. A representative sample is a type of sample that
ensures external validity, or applicability, relative to the overall population of interest [177],
[178]. We will use the terms sample and subset interchangeably. Sampling allows us to learn
about the larger population without studying every unit in the population. Our population is
defined as the set of known, publicly-accepted vulnerabilities published by the CVE from
2014-2019 that have an associated CWE (as described in the previous Section). We consider
two key factors that a ect the representativeness of a sample: sample design, and sample
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Figure 3.10. Sunburst diagram comparison of CWE distribution in open source
datasets
Table 3.4. Percentage of test cases in each CWE pillar by vulnerability dataset
Pillar CVE Total CGC Juliet (C) Juliet (J) OWASP Ben.
CWE-284 10.66% 3.47% 0.95% 0.89% 0.00%
CWE-435 0.07% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00%
CWE-664 45.27% 72.25% 68.48% 25.52% 14.38%
CWE-682 2.53% 9.83% 12.66% 34.06% 0.00%
CWE-691 2.57% 0.00% 0.65% 0.35% 0.00%
CWE-693 4.66% 0.00% 0.47% 1.73% 38.03%
CWE-697 0.03% 1.16% 0.02% 0.12% 0.00%
CWE-703 0.30% 1.16% 0.91% 0.34% 0.00%
CWE-707 32.03% 9.25% 10.40% 33.19% 47.59%




A.N. Kiaer proposed the “representative sampling” method in the 1800s, and described a
representative sample as a miniature of the actual population [179]. In the 1900s Sir A.L.
Bowley formalized Kiaer’s method and introduced two sampling designs for which accuracy
measures and equal inclusion probabilities could be computed: simple and stratified random
sampling [178]. The first step to obtaining a sample in either design is to develop a sampling
frame, i.e., a list of all elements in the population. Our sampling frame includes the 55,128
accepted CVEs with an associated CWE. A high-level overview of our workflow is provided
in Figure 3.11. First, we extracted the data published to the CVE from 2010-2019, then we
added the corresponding CWE pillar information to each CVE. We then proceeded to take
both simple and stratified random samples of the datasets, and finally compared the results
to the distribution of the original population to determine which sampling method provided








original pop.Collect CVE data
Figure 3.11. High level workflow depicting sample design choice
Ultimately, we determined that the stratified random sample provided the most accurate
representation of the original population in the real-world dataset. This process, and the
corresponding results are discussed in the next few sections.
Simple Random Sampling A simple random sample is one in which every possible sample
of size = from a population of # elements has an equal probability of selection; where
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the probability of an element # being selected can be determined using the following
formula [179]:
#!
=!(#   =)! (3.3)
Simple random sampling can be conducted with or without replacement. In the former, each
element is replaced after it has been drawn, and thus, eligible for selection in subsequent
draws. In simple random sampling without replacement, elements are removed after they
have been drawn, and therefore are not eligible for selection in subsequent draws. We perform
simple random sampling without replacement of the CVE data, then aggregate the results by
their associated CWE pillar. Table 3.5 shows the resulting sample size of each pillar when
using simple random sampling without replacement.
Table 3.5. Simple random sample size of each CWE pillar using accepted
CVEs published from 2014-2019











Stratified Random Sampling Stratified sampling reduces the variances of estimators (i.e.,
how far an estimator deviates from an expected value [180]) and improves the e ciency of
the sample design. In stratified sampling, additional information about the sampling frame is
used to partition the population into ! strata, then a sample is selected from each stratum
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) · # (3.4)
To determine the appropriate sample size for each strata we apply Cochran’s formula.





Where =0 is the sample size, / is the Z-value (95%), ? is the estimated proportion of the
population with the given attribute (0.5, maximum variability), @ is 1  ?, and 4 is the margin
of error.
Unlike random sampling, which may result in the misrepresentation of vulnerability instances
and weakness types, stratified sampling allows us to preserve the relative proportions of each
pillar, i.e., strata. Table 3.6 shows the sample size of each pillar using proportionate stratified
sampling.
Table 3.6. Stratified sample size of each CWE pillar using accepted CVEs 
published from 2014-2019











Table 3.7 shows a comparison of sampling methods. In the worst case, stratified random
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sampling results in a 0.02% di erence between the sample size, and the actual population.
On average, there is a 0.00% delta between the stratified random samples, and the actual
population. When using simple random sampling there is a 2.61% di erence between the
sample size and actual population, in the worst case. When using simple random sampling
there is an average delta of 0.60%. By taking a stratified random sample of the data we more
accurately represent the original distribution of vulnerability instances and weakness types
in BVATT.
Table 3.7. Comparison of simple and random sampling methods
Pillar Total Population % Random Sample % Stratified Sample %
CWE-284 10.66 11.21 10.65
CWE-435 0.07 0.00 0.09
CWE-664 45.27 46.70 45.28
CWE-682 2.53 2.64 2.52
CWE-691 2.57 3.69 2.56
CWE-693 4.66 4.62 4.65
CWE-697 0.03 0.00 0.04
CWE-703 0.30 0.13 0.30
CWE-707 32.03 29.42 32.03
CWE-710 1.87 1.58 1.87
The stratified sample reported in Table 3.7 includes only CWE pillar nodes, however we
also took a stratified sample including CWEs that are direct descendants of each CWE pillar.
For example, pillar node CWE-284 has 27 children that are direct descendants. Each child
is a distance of one away from the pillar, and the children’s children are a distance of two
away. With each level of abstraction, the CWEs become more granular. Table 3.8 shows the
distribution of the stratified sample when including nodes one level away from each pillar
node.
We also examined the impact of including CWEs a distance of two away from each pillar
node when taking the stratified sample. We observed that three out of the ten CWE pillars
contain children who are leaf nodes. For example, the maximum depth of Pillar CWE-682,
“Incorrect Calculation,” is one. Meaning that all children of CWE-682 are leaf nodes, and
therefore have no children of their own. As a result, we are unable to achieve a complete
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Table 3.8. Stratified sample (SS) of CVEs using CWE pillars and CWEs 1
node away compared to available test cases

































































stratified sample by using CWEs a distance of two away from each pillar node. The maximum
depth we are able use and maintain a complete stratified sample of each pillar is one. Tables
3.9 and 3.10 illustrate this restriction. For each CWE that is a leaf node, “NONE” is printed
in the corresponding “L2 Child” column indicating that CWE has no children, and the
stratified sample was unable to be completed at that level.
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Table 3.9. Stratified sample (SS) of CVEs using CWE pillars and CWEs a 
distance of two away from each pillar. CWE pillars: 284, 435, 664




























































































Table 3.10. Stratified sample (SS) of CVEs using CWE pillars and CWEs a 
distance of two away from each pillar. CWE pillars: 682, 691, 693, 697, 703, 
707, 710



























































































3.3.6 Test Case Selection
The total number of test cases in BVATT corresponding to each CWE pillar should be equal
to the stratified sample size for that pillar. We must now determine how to select particular
test cases for each strata. Each test case should contain at least one known vulnerability that
corresponds to a CWE in one or more strata. In Section 3.3.6 we explore the possibility of
reusing test cases from existing vulnerability datasets.
Existing vulnerability datasets have been previously discussed in Sections 2.4 and 3.1.1 of
this work. In this section, we summarize some of the strengths and weaknesses of these
datasets, and explore the possibility of reusing test cases from the datasets for BVATT.
Table 3.118 describes 11 publicly available vulnerability datasets, and provides the: cor-
responding source code language, type of code (i.e., real-world (RW), Synthetic (S), and
Hybrid Synthetic (HS)), granularity of vulnerability labels, and whether the test cases in that
dataset are able to be compiled.
Table 3.11. Open source vulnerability datasets.
Open source vulnerability datasets. Code types: real-world (RW), Synthetic (S), and Hybrid
Synthetic (HS). Compilable: Yes (Y), No (N)
Dataset Language Type Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities Compilable
CB-Multios C HS File 888 Y
Juliet C# C# S Function 28,942 Y
Juliet C/C++ C/C++ S Function 64,099 Y
Juliet Java Java S Function 28,881 Y
LAVA M C HS File 2,265 Y
OWASP Benchmark Java S File 2,740 Y
STONESOUP C & Java HS File 7,770 Y
FLVD C RW Function 118 N
VDISC C RW Function n/a N
LinuxFlaw C RW File 368 Y
ferenc JavaScript RW Function 1,496 N
Collectively, these datasets contain over 150K known vulnerabilities. A stratified random
sample indicates that a grand total of roughly 1.2K test cases are needed for BVATT to be
representative of the real-world. We summarize some of the strengths and weaknesses of
these datasets as follows:
8duplicated from Section 2.4.10 for convenience
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1. 82% of these datasets only provide test cases in one source code language.
2. In 6 of the datasets, vulnerabilities are labeled at a file level; while in 5 of the datasets
vulnerabilities are labeled at a function level.
3. Collectively, these datasets provide a 4:4:3 ratio of pure synthetic, real-world, and
hybrid synthetic code.
4. 8 of the 11 datasets provide code that is able to be compiled.
5. We have demonstrated that most of these datasets provide an unbalanced ratio of
vulnerability types [22].
Providing vulnerability labels at a finer granularity, e.g., function level, has been shown
to provide a more insightful and quantitative assessment of the performance of di erent
vulnerability identification techniques [137]. Pure synthetic vulnerabilities have been
criticized for being overly simplistic and not representative of vulnerabilities in the real-
world, while some of the real-world repositories are limited because they provide source
code that cannot be compiled. Some VATTs operate on source code, e.g., [75], [88], [181],
while others, are compatible with compiled code [80], [83], [137].
Considering each of these observations, we propose that, in addition to providing adequate
coverage of CWEs, BVATT be comprised of test cases that o er the following:
1. a mixture of real-world, synthetic, and hybrid synthetic code
2. a mixture of source code languages
3. source code that is able to be compiled
4. both function and file level vulnerability labels
Given these additional requirements for BVATT, we eliminate the FLVD, VDISC, and ferenc
datasets from consideration as the test cases within those datasets are not able to be compiled.
We now consider how to down-select test cases from the remaining datasets to the number
required for BVATT. We reduce the test-suite not only to be reflective of the stratified random
sample, but also because the size of a benchmark has been shown to be proportional to the
cost, e.g., execution time, and level of e ort related to testing and comparing VATTs [182].
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Test-Suite Reduction Strategies
There are a number of existing methods to reduce a test-suite (also referred to as test-suite
minimization, or test-suite reduction). Unfortunately, the majority of these methods apply to
software testing in a traditional sense— where the focus is on fault detection [183]–[190]. In
the case of BVATT, a VATT analyzes a test case containing at least one known vulnerability,
attempts to identify the vulnerability, and reports any findings.
Nevertheless, we consider the following test-suite reduction techniques from fault detection-
based software detection: identify and eliminate redundant and obsolete test cases [187],
use a fuzzy clustering algorithm to identify redundant cases [188], use the ratio of code
coverage to test case cost [189], and use a dynamic call tree or calling context tree to identify
a subset of test cases that cover the same call tree paths [190]. Techniques that are based
on code coverage, obsolete test cases, and call trees are not relevant to our particular use
case. However, techniques to prune redundant test cases may be applicable. In the following
section we explore two methods to identify and eliminate redundant test cases from a corpus.
Identify and Eliminate Redundant Test Cases
In traditional software testing a redundant test case is one that provides the same coverage
measure as another test case, so the removal of a redundant test case will not impact the
overall testing coverage [187]. Within the context of test-suite reduction for BVATT, we
define a redundant test case as a test case with greater than a specified measure of similarity
to another test case. Determining whether two programs are equivalent in the general case
is a well known undecidable problem9. Thus, we specifically focus our e orts on deciding
whether the programs exceed a similarly threshold based on a set of defined features.
Test Suite Reduction Based on Vulnerability Characteristics
Matt Bishop proposed a representation of vulnerabilities based on a set of characteristics
that he described as the, “conditions that must hold for a vulnerability to exist” [191].
Bishop postulated that the similarity between vulnerabilities could be determined by applying
set intersection to basic sets of vulnerability characteristics. In 2002, Sophie Engle refined
this definition and described characteristics in terms of preconditions, then applied the
9See Section 4.6.1
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methodology to identify a set of characteristics for stack-based bu er overflows [192]. Table
3.12 outlines 11 characteristics related to bu er overflow vulnerabilities. For example, the
G: 9<?B and G:4G4B characteristics describe the ability to jump (20=_ 9D<?) to memory on
the stack and execute instructions (20=_4G42) stored on the stack.
Table 3.12. Buffer overflow characteristics
Characteristic Description Value








x:addr may_contain(input, addr) true
x:inst may_contain(input, inst) true
x:type may_contain(input, type(flowvar)) true
Table 3.13. Buffer overflow basic characteristic sets
Type Basic Characteristic Set
Direct executable bu er overflow {x:bu , x:addr, x:inst, x:rval, x:jmps, x:exes}
Indirect executable bu er overflow {x:bu , x:addr, x:fptr, x:jmph, x:exes}
Direct data bu er overflow {x:bu , x:type, x:vval, x:path}
Indirect data bu er overflow {x:bu , x:addr, x:vptr, x:path}
Table 3.13 describes the basic characteristic sets for four bu er overflow vulnerability
equivalence classes [193]. In an executable bu er overflow, the return address(033A) or
function pointer( 5 ?CA) is modified to either directly or indirectly cause code(4G4B) that was
placed into a bu er(1D 5 5 ) to be executed. Alternatively, a data bu er overflow occurs when
overflow from the bu er alters the content of another variable on the stack.
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We note two weaknesses with this method to determine if test cases are similar. First, the
process of reviewing the source code and identifying relevant characteristics is entirely
manual. While the e ort is likely not significant for a few test cases, we have over 150K test
cases to review. The application of a manual method to all cases in our test suite would be a
significant undertaking. Second, Bishop and Engle have only established the characteristics
for stack and heap based bu er overflow vulnerabilities [192], [194]. Thus, to use their
technique, we would need to develop characteristics and vulnerability classes for each other
type of vulnerability in the stratified sample. This is a significant undertaking, and thus we
choose to explore other, less manual alternatives.
Test Suite Reduction Based on Feature Vectors
In Section 3.3.6 we explored a method to identify and eliminate test cases based on their
characteristics, and determined that such a method would require significant manual e ort.
Instead of using the characteristic method proposed by Bishop and Engle [192], [194],
we propose a more automated method, based on the feature vector for each test case. By
representing each test case as a feature vector, we can plot each vector as a point in an
=-dimensional space, where = is equal to the number of distinct features in the vector. We
can then calculate the geometric distance between any two points, or in our case, test cases.
The closer two points are the more similar the feature vectors are for those samples. Or, in
the context of test suite reduction, the farther two points are from one another, the more
dissimilar the feature vectors are for those samples.
In order to leverage the proposed technique we require a means to extract features from over
150K test cases. After extraction, the features must be cleaned and transformed into vectors
so that they are compatible with machine learning classifiers. The classifiers can be used to
cluster the test cases based on how similar they are, and finally, we can identify the least
similar set of test cases for BVATT. These requirements provide the basis for the remainder
of our work, including the creation of the tool, BiSECT. BiSECT allows users to extract
a number of common features from compiled binaries, and transform them into a format
compatible with traditional machine learning and data mining techniques. BiSECT and a
few example applications of the tool (including using it to facilitate test-suite reduction) are
described in Chapter 4.
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a framework for BVATT. We first examined existing datasets
containing known vulnerabilities, and explored their associated limitations. This was followed
by lessons learned from existing benchmark implementations. From these, we determined
that BVATT should be repeatable, reproducible, fair, verifiable. After exploring each of
these characteristics, we investigated what it would require for BVATT to be relevant, that is,
representative of reality. To this end, we determined that a stratified random sample of CVEs
and corresponding CWEs would provide a perfect representation of known vulnerability
instances and types that have occurred in the wild throughout the past decade. Finally, we
explored methods to leverage test cases in existing vulnerability datasets for BVATT. In
Section 3.3.6 we demonstrated that existing methods to identify and eliminate similar test
cases may require significant manual e ort. We sought a more automated method, which
ultimately led us to create a new tool, BiSECT. BiSECT allows users to extract a number
of common features from compiled binaries, and transform them into a format compatible
with traditional machine learning and data mining techniques. In Chapter 4 we give a full
introduction of BiSECT, and provide a couple of use cases to demonstrate the various utilities
of the tool. In Section 4.6 we demonstrate how BiSECT can be used to identify and eliminate
similar test cases for BVATT.
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CHAPTER 4:
BiSECT: Binary Synthesized Extraction, Cleaning,
and Transformation
In their early days, computer security and artificial intelligence didn’t seem to
have much to say to each other. AI researchers were interested in making
computers do things that only humans had been able to do, while security
researchers aimed to fix the leaks in the plumbing of the computing
infrastructure or design infrastructures they deemed leakproof. [...] But the two
fields have grown closer over the years
Carl E. Landwehr, Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence
4.1 Introduction
Today, software is integrated into nearly every aspect of our lives, and so are its vulnerabilities.
Between 1999 and early 2020 over 150,000 software vulnerabilities were reported by the
Common Vulnerabilities and Enumerations (CVE) database [6]. In 2020, the Ponemon
Institute reviewed over 500 data breaches (often resulting from exploited vulnerabilities),
and found that the cost of a single breach averaged US$3.8M [8]. Figure 4.1 shows the
findings of the Ponemon study by industry. The average costs are measured by direct loss of
business, and also account for detection, notification, and post-breach recovery e orts.
The Stuxnet and Duqu worms demonstrated how vulnerability exploitation can go beyond
financial damage, and disrupt critical operations [9], [10]. In 2020, the Sunburst malware was
used to compromise thousands of government systems and an estimated 18,000 firms [13].
Despite substantial investments in system security, vulnerabilities persist. Recent data
exfiltration [14] and ransomware [15] attacks further illustrate the cybersecurity problem.
In May 2021, the US government issued an order requiring the development of guidance
related to the employment of, “automated tools, or comparable processes, that check for
known and potential vulnerabilities” [23].
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Figure 4.1. Average cost in millions per data breach in 2020. Source: [8].
Yet the question remains: how can we identify and reduce software vulnerabilities? One
reduction approach is to begin with the assumption that all software contains vulnerabilities,
then test each program to find as many vulnerabilities as possible [17]. The pervasiveness
and variety of software is disproportionate to the number of individuals able to manually
identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in it. Ergo, in an attempt to reduce this monumental
and seemingly unending problem, researchers have turned to tools and techniques (i.e.,
VATTs) to amplify the vulnerability analysis process. We discussed a number of VATTs in
Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2 we also explored the various limitations of current VATTs. For
example, early static analysis tools, such as Lint and Flawfinder are criticized for having low
precision rates and minimal semantic insights [69], [75]. Dynamic analysis techniques such
as fuzzing, dynamic symbolic execution, and taint analysis o er increased semantic insights,
but are limited by issues including complex memory management and the path explosion
problem [19], [21], [79]–[81], [88]. In addition to traditional static and dynamic techniques,
researchers are also using data mining and machine learning techniques to identify and
analyze software vulnerabilities [27], [28]. These techniques have shown encouraging results;
however, there is no tool to synthesize the at scale extraction, cleaning, and transformation
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of features commonly used in data mining and machine learning based vulnerability analysis.
Consequently, such advanced techniques are left to a niche group of computer scientists
who are experts in both the vulnerability analysis and machine learning domains. This dual
requirement acts as barrier to both security and machine learning researchers, and ultimately
limits advancements in a promising area of vulnerability analysis. The limitations of machine
learning-based software vulnerability analysis are further compounded when the target is
compiled code (i.e., binary samples, binaries). According to two major surveys, only 3% of
machine learning- and data mining-based vulnerability research leveraged binary samples,
while the remaining 97% requires the use of high level source code [27], [28]. We believe
that this disparity is due to an additional increase in the domain expertise required to analyze
assembly code lifted from the binaries; it lacks the rich semantic information o ered by high
level languages (e.g., C, Java, etc.).
In this chapter we introduce a new tool, BiSECT (Binary Synthesized Extraction, Cleaning,
and Transformation). BiSECT breaks down the aforementioned barriers by providing a
user-friendly, synthesized, and repeatable means to extract and transform common features
from compiled code (i.e., samples).
To summarize, we make the following contributions throughout this Chapter:
1. Provide the tool, BiSECT, to synthesize the extraction, cleaning, and transformation
of common features from compiled binaries to be compatible with data mining and
machine learning techniques.
2. Use the output of BiSECT to assess the e cacy of two representation models (and
corresponding classifiers), fastText and Doc2Vec, when they are given the task of
labeling potentially vulnerable functions.
3. Examine the impact of using balanced and imbalanced datasets when training the
fastText and Doc2Vec classifiers on binary samples.
4. Use BiSECT to prepare the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence in support of binary vulnera-
bility analysis.
5. Use the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence to train a classifier able to label function-level
vulnerabilities in a balanced hybrid-synthetic assembly code base with 96.4% accuracy,
97.8% precision, 94.8% recall, a False Positive Rate of 2.1%, False Negative Rate of
5.2%, and F1 of 96.3%
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6. Demonstrate how BiSECT can be leveraged to identify the most dissimilar test cases
in a test suite
4.1.1 Motivation and Chapter Outline
In addition to traditional static and dynamic techniques, in the past decade a number of
researchers have begun to leverage machine learning and data mining techniques to support
vulnerability analysis. The first four steps of the data mining process include data cleaning,
integration, selection, and transformation [37]. While machine learning typically begins
with the transformation step, it is assumed that certain preprocessing steps, i.e., the first
few steps in the data mining process, have already been completed [38]. Both the machine
learning and data mining processes also assume that the initial dataset has already been
created. We find these assumptions to be significant, as the extraction and transformation of
even a single feature from a binary file requires domain expertise. By feature, we simply
mean a measurable property or characteristic of a program.
To demonstrate how nontrivial the extraction and transformation of features can quickly
become, we provide two examples. The first, in Section 4.2.3, details methods to identify the
McCabe cyclomatic complexity for each function in a binary file. The second, in Section
4.2.4, details the identification and extraction of mnemonic n-grams from a binary. After
demonstrating the domain expertise required to manually extract features such as these, we
discuss techniques to automate the process using Python and Ghidra. In Section 4.3 we
explore the process to clean, transform, and finally, to amalgamate the data into a feature
vector that is compatible with conventional machine learning and data mining techniques.
The domain expertise required to complete the feature extraction, cleaning, and transformation
steps results in a barrier to entry that in turn inhibits advancements in the application of
machine learning and data mining techniques to analyze software vulnerabilities. To reduce
the domain expertise required to perform these steps, we propose a new tool, BiSECT. BiSECT
enables researchers to synthesize the extraction of a number of common features from
compiled binaries, and transform them into a format compatible with traditional machine
learning and data mining techniques. At its core BiSECT is a collection of stand-alone
Python scripts, Jupyter notebooks [195], and scripts intended to be used with the open
source software reverse engineering (SRE) suite, Ghidra [168]. We designed BiSECT to be
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user friendly, however, to further support researchers, BiSECT is accompanied by a Jupyter
notebook that provides detailed documentation, and uses simple examples to illustrate some
of the key functionality provided by the tool.
To demonstrate the utility of BiSECT, two example applications are described in Sections 4.5
and 4.6. In the first application, provided in Section 4.5, we use BiSECT to extract, clean, and
transform roughly 5M disassembled x86 functions from 64K compiled C \ C++ programs.
We then use the output of BiSECT to compare the e cacy of two representation models and
corresponding classifiers, fastText and Doc2Vec, when they are given the task of labeling
potentially vulnerable functions. In the second application, provided in Section 4.6, we use
BiSECT to identify similar test cases for BVATT.
Throughout the next few sections we explore the key functionalities provided by BiSECT. To
add clarity to our discussion we reference Figure 4.2 numerous times. In each major section
we repeat the figure with the current area of exploration in color, and the remainder of the
figure in light gray.
Figure 4.2. The complete high-level workflow for BiSECT
Malware Analysis
Like vulnerabilities, the amount and variety of malware is disproportionate to the number of
researchers able to analyze it. The malware community uses an array of tools and techniques
to amplify the malware analysis process— Some of these involve machine learning and data
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mining. Common feature types used to support machine learning-based malware detection
and analysis include: byte sequences, permissions, intents, activities, services, providers,
information flow, APIs/system calls, opcodes, network, file system, CPU registers, Portable
Executable (PE) file characteristics, and strings or other cleartext information [196], [197].
A few of these features, including: opcodes, information flow, strings, and system calls,
overlap with features that have demonstrated applicability to the vulnerability analysis
community [27], [137].
Significant research has been published, and numerous techniques and features proposed
to support static and dynamic machine learning-based malware detection and analysis10.
However, there are limited open source tools available to support the synthesized extraction,
cleaning, and transformation of multiple features from binary files in support of this
work. The open source tools that are available primarily focus on the extraction, cleaning,
and or transformation of 1-2 features and do not provide general support. For example,
DroidAPIMiner can be used to extract critical API calls from Android applications. The
tool also extracts API package level and parameter information, in addition to permission
information [198]. Jackstab transforms machine code into an intermediate language to
perform data flow analysis of the control flow graph for a binary. The tool produces the
full disassembly (with all reachable instructions), a Control Flow Graph (CFG) in the
intermediate language, and a CFG of the assembly instructions [199]. KiloGram facilitates
the extraction of the, “the top-k most frequent n-grams for large values of k and n” [200].
Manalyze parses and statically analyzes PE files for information such as: compiler version,
whether the file is packed, languages detected, header information, dynamically linked
libraries and functions, and debug information [201].
In 2008, Cavalca and Goldoni proposed HIVE (now referred to as “TheHive Project”),
an open source honeynet to provide, “rapid comprehension and detailed data analysis,”
of malware samples [202]. TheHive Project includes the Cortex toolset. Cortex allows
users to analyze “observables” or features, i.e., measurable property or event, at scale by
querying a single tool. To the best of our knowledge TheHive project, specifically the
Cortex component, provides the most comprehensive toolset that enables the extraction,
cleaning and transformation of features from malware samples. Cortex currently facilitates
the extraction of observables such as: IP and email addresses, URLs, domain names, files or
10See [196] for a recent review of such work.
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hashes. Unfortunately, most of the features that have demonstrated utility in vulnerability
analysis are not extracted by TheHive Project at the time of this writing.
The opportunity to develop a toolset to synthesize the extraction, transformation, and cleaning
of features in support of binary vulnerability analysis persists, and provides a fundamental
motivation for the creation of BiSECT. Like Cortex, BiSECT reduces the manual e ort
required to extract common features from binary files by synthesizing and standardizing the
output from multiple tools.
4.2 Feature Extraction
In this section, we explore one of the core functionalities provided by BiSECT, feature
extraction, as depicted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. BiSECT Feature extraction component
Figure 4.4 provides a treemap of commonly leveraged predictors used in data mining and
machine learning vulnerability analysis techniques, according to 58 works reviewed in two
major surveys [27], [137]. Throughout the surveys 15 types of features were repeatedly
used as predictors for vulnerabilities. These features are categorized by two branches of
the same tree— if the tree is all machine learning and data mining methods currently
used to identify vulnerabilities in software, one branch (shown in green on the treemap)
includes “graph-based” features. All of the other features on the second branch (shown in
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shades of brown) are considered “code-based”. In general, the most prevalent predictors
used throughout these surveys include the following: abstract syntax trees (AST) or other
graphical representations of the program, API usage patterns, complexity metrics, and
function metrics. Combined, these predictors were leveraged in 50% of the studies reviewed
























Figure 4.4. Treemap of most commonly used predictors in 58 publications,
to support vulnerability analysis using data mining and machine learning.
Adapted from [27], [137].
4.2.1 Feature Engineering
The term feature engineering has an array of definitions across the machine learning, data
science, and data mining disciplines. Some definitions generalize the term in such a way that
there is clear overlap with BiSECT [203], while others highlight clear delineations [204],
[205]. Due to this ambiguity, we have decided to remove the term feature engineering from
our work altogether, and instead focus on providing a clear description of the BiSECT tool.
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4.2.2 Compiled Code Features
In 2017, Gha arian and Shahriari provided a survey of work that uses machine learning
or data mining techniques to identify and analyze software vulnerabilities [27]. Of the 39
publications reviewed in the survey a total of 3, or roughly 8% [39]–[41] used compiled
binaries to support their research (including one sample that used both binary and source
code samples), the remaining 92% relied on source code level samples. Researchers have
also begun to apply neural networks and deep learning techniques to software vulnerability
identification and analysis. A comprehensive survey of notable work in this area was
published in 2020, by Lin, et al. [28]. In their survey, the authors review 19 vulnerability
detection methods that leverage deep neural networks published between 2013 and 2019. Of
the 19 works reviewed, 5 used compiled code samples to support their work [40], [42]–[44]11,
two used a mix of binary and source code samples [45], [46], and the remaining 13 used
source code samples – 7 out of 19, or roughly 37%, is a significant increase from the mere
8% in the 2017 survey of conventional machine learning and data mining research that used
binary samples [27]. Yet, the disparity between vulnerability analysis using source code
verses compiled code persists.
During the compilation process much of the semantic and syntactic information o ered by
high-level languages (e.g., C, Java, etc.) is lost, resulting in samples that are significantly
more di cult to analyze [21], [47], [48]. This level of di culty is inversely related to the
number of researchers using binary samples to support vulnerability research (using machine
learning and data mining techniques). This relationship can be observed in the 58 papers
reviewed from the two surveys where only 3% of the work reviewed leveraged compiled
code samples [27], [28]. Yet, there are situations when the analysis of binary samples is
desirable or necessary, for example, a user may need to validate that properties proven
by analyzing a program’s source code still hold after the program has been compiled, or
simply may not have access to a program’s source code [21], [47], [49], [50]. To support and
encourage research in binary code vulnerability analysis, BiSECT was designed to extract
features specifically from binary samples.
While some features (e.g., file size) can be extracted from a raw binary file, most features rely
of the presence of some level of semantic or syntactic information, and thus, the binary must
be disassembled prior to analysis. We note that many of these features could also be derived
11Grieco, et al. [40] was referenced in both the 2017 and 2020 survey
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by writing a custom parser, however such methods are beyond the scope of this research.12
Before reviewing the specific features able to be extracted and curated by BiSECT, we first
introduce various feature types.
Feature Types
An initial assumption in the machine learning and data mining processes is that a dataset has
already been created. Datasets are typically comprised of rows and columns. Rows equate
to objects or individual entities, e.g., each binary sample could be an object in our dataset.
The columns in the dataset correspond to one or more features or attributes associated with
each object, where each feature has an associated type. Figure 4.5 illustrates the location of
objects, features, and vectors in a dataset.
Figure 4.5. Objects, features, and feature vectors
The type of a feature is the set of possible values for that feature. We describe a number
of feature types in Table 4.1 [37]. At a high level, feature types are either qualitative or
quantitative. The former includes features that are described without using an actual quantity,
while in the latter, integers or real values are used to represent the feature. Qualitative features
can be nominal, binary, or ordinal. Quantitative features may be interval or ratio-scaled.
Some features (e.g., ordinals) may have a meaningful order, while others, such as nominal
and symmetric binary features, have no meaningful order.
BiSECT Features and Feature Types
Table 4.2 provides the features that can be extracted withBiSECT. Each feature was specifically
selected based on its relevance to vulnerability analysis of binary files, demonstrated
12To the reader interested in custom parsers, we suggest the open source parser generator, ANTLR
https://www.antlr.org/
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Table 4.1. Description of commonly used feature types.
Feature Type Ordered Description
Qualitative Feature described without using actual quantity
Nominal, Nom Unordered symbols or names of things (e.g., enumerations)
Binary, Bin Feature with 2 states: 0 or 1 (0 typically means that the
feature is absent, 1 that it is present)
Symmetric, Sym Unordered Both states equally valuable / no preference for a specific
outcome
Asymmetric, Asy Ordered One state more important or desirable than the other.
Convention is that the rarest outcome is coded as a 1,
and the other by 0
Boolean, Bool Unordered Binary feature with two states: True and False
Ordinal, Ord Ordered possible values that have a meaningful order or ranking
among them, but the magnitude between successive
values is not known
Quantitative
Numeric Measurable quantity (integer or real value)
Interval-scaled, IS Ordered measured on a scale of equal-size units. Values may be
positive, 0, or negative.
Ratio-scaled, RS Ordered an ordered, numeric feature containing an inherent
zero-point (i.e., a multiple or ratio of another value)
usefulness in previous studies, and potential for use in future studies. Table 4.2 also indicates
the granularity of each feature extracted. For example, the Cyc. Complexity, i.e., the McCabe
cyclomatic complexity, is extracted at the function level for each sample, while the Max
Complexity is aggregated at the file level. The “Related Research” column provides references
to publications that leverage the corresponding feature.
Feature Extraction Techniques
To facilitate the synthesized extraction of features from binary files a myriad of tools and
techniques can be used. Determining which tool or technique to apply largely depends on
the specific feature being extracted. BiSECT synthesizes the feature extraction process so
that users no longer have to write custom scripts, or use multiple tools to create commonly
used features.
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Table 4.2. Description of all raw and constructed features extracted by
BiSECT
Feature Related Research Granularity
Strings [206]–[208] Func & File
Mnemonics [209]–[211] Func & File
Mnemonic Frequency Func & File
Unique Mnemonics Func & File
#-Grams [33], [110], [113], [212] Func & File
Shannon Entropy [213]–[216] File








Instructions [30], [31], [44], [181] Func & File
FuzzyInstructions Func
BiSECT relies solely on publicly available tools (namely, Ghidra), and custom developed
Python scripts. BiSECT has been made completely open source13, and is available on
GitHub14. BiSECT can be run from the command line, or in a more interactive way via
Jupyter. In fact, the entire BiSECT workflow is documented in a Jupyter Notebook. We hope
is that these resources will be leveraged by researchers as both a learning and research aid. A
synopsis of the technique that was used to extract each feature is provided in Table 4.3.
4.2.3 Feature Example: Cyclomatic Complexity
In 1976, Thomas McCabe introduced the concept of cyclomatic complexity [222]. The
McCabe cyclomatic complexity is a software metric that identifies the maximum number of
linearly independent paths in a program [222]. Linearly independent paths have at minimum
one edge that is not shared by any other path [222]. The formula for McCabe cyclomatic
13The link will become active after the final dissertation has been approved!
14https://github.com/Kayla0x41/BiSECT
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Table 4.3. Summary of the tool or technique used to generate each feature
from binary samples
















complexity (CYC) can be given in the context of a flow graph, or a directed graph containing
the program’s basic blocks. If program control can pass between two basic blocks in the
graph there exists an edge between them, where the direction of the edge indicates the
direction in which control flows. Mathematically, McCabe cyclomatic complexity can be
expressed as follows [222]:
⇠.⇠ = ⇢   # + 2 ⇤ % (4.1)
Where ⇢ is number of edges, # is the number of nodes, and % is the number of connected
components.
Cyclomatic Complexity Extraction
Consider the example program in Listing 4.1 to calculate the Fibonacci sequence for 10
numbers. When the <08=() function is called, a sequence of conditional statements begins.
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Using the flow graph depicted in Figure 4.6 we can visualize the control flow for the program,
and calculate the McCabe computational complexity for the <08=() function. The number
of edges ⇢ in the function is 7, the number of nodes # is 6 and the number of connected
components % is 1, thus the ⇠.⇠ is 3.
⇠.⇠ = 7   6 + 2 ⇤ 1
Figure 4.6. Control flow graph (CFG) for Fibonacci example code
The example in Listing 4.1 is trivial. Programs, even those that are synthetic, do not typically
consist of a single function containing a few conditional statements. Moreover, the example
provided here demonstrates how to calculate the McCabe cyclomatic complexity given the
source code for a function. An additional level of complexity15 is added when determining
the McCabe complexity for functions in compiled code.
15pun intended
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1 int main(int argc, const char* argv[]) {




6 fib[0] = 0;
7 fib[1] = 1;
8 printf("Calculating Fibonacci for %d terms: \n", size);
9
10 for (x = 0; x < size; x++) {
11 if (x <= 1) {
12 fib[x] = x;
13 } else {






Listing 4.1: Fibonacci example C code
To calculate the cyclomatic complexity beginning with compiled code, the binary must first
be disassembled. The assembly can then be parsed at a function level, and the cyclomatic
complexity calculated for each function by interpreting the assembly instructions.
A subset of the x86-64 assembly for the previous example is provided in Figure 4.7. The
code was compiled using GCC version 9.3 with debug symbols included:
$ gcc ≠g ≠c f i b o n a c c i _ e x a m p l e . c ≠o f i b o n a c c i _ e x a m p l e . exe
The assembly was generated using the following objdump command:
$ objdump ≠d ≠S ≠≠no≠show≠raw≠ i n s n f i b o n a c c i _ e x a m p l e . exe
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For clarity, the assembly in Figure 4.7 has been partitioned into sections, and the C-code
corresponding to each section is provided for a quick side by side comparison. The loss of
the high level code’s rich semantic and syntactic information during compilation is clearly
evident. As a result of this loss, additional expertise is required to interpret the assembly and
calculate cyclomatic complexity.
Figure 4.7. Assembly vs. C-Code Fibonacci example snippet
To demonstrate how nontrivial the extraction of this feature rapidly becomes we extracted
the total real (i.e, non-stub) functions for 47K compiled binaries using Ghidra. Each binary
is a synthetic test case from either the CB-Multios corpus [141] or Juliet C corpus [26].
Each sample was compiled using GCC on an Ubuntu version 21.04 virtual machine. Figure
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4.8 depicts the total number of real functions in all samples by their associated CWE pillar,
capturing a total of 5,123,148 functions. Figure 4.9 describes the total function count in
terms of their McCabe cyclomatic complexity. Manual identification of the function-level
cyclomatic complexity for compiled code is clearly insurmountable.
Figure 4.8. Total function count by CWE Pillar
Cyclomatic Complexity Vulnerability Research
A number of researchers have explored the correlation between cyclomatic complexity and
software security. The below timeline highlights some of this work. A common theme in
these works is that higher complexity levels may be associated with security risks such as
vulnerabilities. In 2008, Yonghee Shin and Laurie Williams explore whether cyclomatic
complexity can be used to predict vulnerabilities [218]. The authors build upon their
previous study in 2008, when they examine the correlation of various complexity metrics
to known vulnerable components from the JavaScript Engine in the Mozilla application
framework [219]. The work is continued in 2011 when Shin, et. al. discuss the utility of
complexity, code churn, and developer activity as predictors of vulnerable code locations [92];
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Figure 4.9. Total function count by cyclomatic complexity
and again in 2011, when Shin and Williams examine complexity metrics specifically collected
during program execution [91].
Other notable work includes the following: a 2011 study on the use of complexity and other
software metrics as early indicators of vulnerabilities [220], a 2015 study on a method to
improve the e ectiveness of fuzzing techniques using computational complexity [221], and a
framework called LEOPARD, proposed in 2020, to identify potentially vulnerable functions
using metrics such as complexity [181].
Each of these studies explores the e cacy of using cyclomatic complexity to enhance various
aspects of vulnerability research. With the exception of the LEOPARD framework in [181],
none are accompanied by a tool to support other researchers or reproduce findings. The
LEOPARD framework operates on source code. LEOPARD first uses complexity metrics to
bin program functions, then uses other vulnerability metrics to prioritize functions for further
analysis based on how potentially vulnerable they are. BiSECT di ers from LEOPARD in
two primary ways: first, BiSECT extracts features from binary files. Second, the final result of
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LEOPARD is a list of functions that has been prioritized based on their associated potential
vulnerabilities. The final result from BiSECT is a dataset of features that has been curated to
support data mining and machine learning algorithms.
2008 An empirical model to predict security vulnerabilities using code complexity metrics, [218]
2008 Is Complexity Really the Enemy of Software Security? [219]
2011 Using complexity, coupling, and cohesion metrics as early indicators of vuln. [220]
2011 Evaluating Complexity [...] Metrics as Indicators of Software. vuln., [92]
2011 [...] on the use of execution complexity metrics as indicators of software vuln. [91]
2013 Using complexity metrics to improve software security [93]
2015 Improving Fuzzing Using Software Complexity Metrics [221]
2020 LEOPARD: Identifying Vulnerable Code [...] through Program Metrics [181]
T        1: Cyclomatic Complexity Related Vulnerability Research
4.2.4 Feature Example: N-Grams
An #-gram is a contiguous sequence of items of length # in a given sample [223]. As an
example, consider the following sentence:
The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog
This sentence can be broken up into many di erent ’grams’ depending on the level of
granularity, Table 4.4 provides a few examples of n-grams of a few word and letter grams of
di erent lengths.
In the English language the granularity of #-grams can include characters, words, sentences,
and even clauses. Once the sample has been partitioned at the chosen level, it is said to have
been tokenized [223]. An #-gram token is simply a single unit or gram from a tokenized
sample. As an example, in Table 4.4, the first token in the word-level 3-grams (i.e., trigram)
is “the quick brown.” In this way the term #-gram token is somewhat similar to a lexical
token, or a single unit defined in the specification of a programming language [89]. There
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Table 4.4. Example n-grams of varying granularity levels
Granularity Size (#) Result
Word 3 the quick brown | quick brown fox | brown fox jumps | fox
jumps over | jumps over the | over the lazy | the lazy dog
Word 4 the quick brown fox | quick brown fox jumps | brown fox
jumps over | fox jumps over the | jumps over the lazy | over
the lazy dog
Letter 5 t h e _ q | h e _ q u | e _ q u i |_ q u i c | q u i c k | u i c k _ | i
c k _ b | c k _ b r
are five types of lexical tokens (at the source code level) in most programming languages:
keywords, identifiers, operators, separators, and literals. We can use these lexical tokens as
logical starting place to determining appropriate #-gram tokens in a binary sample.
N-Grams Extraction
Similar to computational complexity, to extract #-grams from compiled code the binary
must first be disassembled16. #-grams from the disassembled binary samples will be in the
form of assembly code. Thus, assembly keywords may include things such as instructions,
mnemonics or opcodes (e.g., "$+ , -$',  ⇡⇡); literals may include string constants (e.g.,
“hello”, “all your #-grams are belong to me”, etc.).
Consider again the Fibonacci example discussed in the previous section— Figure 4.7 provides
a subset of the assembly code for the sample. Figure 4.10 outlines the first 20 mnemonic
#-grams, where # = 2, 3, or 4, extracted from the full sample. In this short sample a total of
86 2-grams (i.e., bigrams), 87 3-grams (i.e., trigrams), and 88 4-grams can be extracted.
To demonstrate how nontrivial the extraction of this feature rapidly becomes, we extracted
all 2, 3, and 4 mnemonic-grams from 47K compiled binaries using Ghidra. For consistency,
these are the same samples used in Cyclomatic Complexity, Section 4.2.3. Figure 4.11 shows
16#-grams could also be discovered by writing a custom parser
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Figure 4.10. First 20 2,3,4-grams from the full Fibonacci.c example
the total number of 2,3 and 4-grams in the 47K samples by associated CWE pillar, capturing
a total of 2.5 billion #-grams. Like the function-level McCabe cyclomatic complexity,
identification of #-grams in binary code requires domain expertise, and manual e orts do
not scale to the number of grams possible in any given sample.
N-Grams Vulnerability Research
The concept of an #-gram was first introduced in 1948, by C. E. Shannon, in A Mathematical
Theory of Communication [224]. Shannon used preceding #-grams to predict the next letter
or word in a text [224]. Since the mid-1900’s #-grams have been used to support a variety
of research areas including: natural language processing (e.g., speech recognition, machine
translation, and predictive text input), communication theory, computational linguistics,
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Figure 4.11. Count of #-grams in 47K samples by associated CWE Pillar
computational biology, and data compression. In the system security domain #-grams
have been used to identify malicious code, determine malware authorship, and to detect
spam [225]–[230].
In the last decade #-grams have also been used to facilitate vulnerability research. While
not specifically examining vulnerabilities17, [212] presents a technique to use #-grams
and rank event handlers for faults in graphical user interfaces. In 2014, Scandariato et
al. [110] used a text mining bag-of-words approach leveraging #-grams to predict which
components of source code are likely to be vulnerable. Also in 2014, Walden et al. [33]
examined the strengths and weaknesses of using text mining and software metrics such as
#-grams as vulnerability predictors. Pang et al. [113] used a combination of #-grams and
feature selection algorithms to predict vulnerable components in Java class files.
17See Chapter 1 for a description of the di erences between faults and software vulnerabilities
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2011 GUI Software Fault Localization Using N-gram Analysis, [212]
2014 Predicting Vuln. Sw. Components via Text Mining, [110]
2014 Predicting Vuln. Components: Sw. Metrics vs Text Mining, [33]
2015 Predicting Vuln. Sw. Components through N-Gram Analysis [...], [113]
2016 Toward Large-Scale Vulnerability Discovery using Machine Learning, [40]
T        2: Vulnerability research using #-grams
4.3 Data Cleaning and Transformation
After each feature has been extracted the data must be cleaned, consolidated, and transformed
into a format that is compatible with machine learning algorithms and data mining techniques.
The cleaning and transformation processes may involve the following steps [37]:
1. Missing Values missing or incomplete values are removed, ignored, or replaced
2. Smoothing noise and outliers removed from data using binning, regression, or other
outlier analysis (e.g., clustering)
3. Numerics non-numeric data is transformed into a numeric representation
4. Aggregation summary and aggregation operations are applied to the data
5. Normalization/Scaling features are normalized or scaled to fall within a smaller
range (e.g., 0.0 to 1.0)
6. Discretization raw values of numeric data are binned by being transformed into
interval ranges or conceptual labels
7. Feature Construction new features are constructed from existing features
In Section 4.2 we provided an overview of the primary features directly extracted from
binary files by BiSECT. In this section we explore two additional functionalities provided by
BiSECT: data cleaning, and transformations. Figure 4.12 indicates where these steps reside
in the overall BiSECT workflow.
As indicated in Figure 4.12, some steps, such as cleaning missing values or smoothing data
to remove outliers can be completed regardless of the features selected for analysis. Other
steps, such as normalizing or aggregating data, and constructing new features may or may
not be completed depending on the initial feature set and the user’s end goals.
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Figure 4.12. BiSECT data cleaning and transformation steps
In the following sections we will describe the process to clean and transform features using
BiSECT.
4.3.1 Data Cleaning
When using real-world data objects, such as binary files, some files may have missing,
inconsistent, or incomplete attributes. Data cleaning typically involves two steps, dealing
with missing values and smoothing outliers. Missing or incomplete values must first be
identified, then either replaced, dropped, or ignored. It is important to note that missing
values may not be the result of an error. For example, consider a feature, strings, that specifies
the set of all unique strings in a binary sample. If a sample has no strings, this feature will
appear to be missing for that data object.
Missing Values
During the missing values step, the user may choose to ignore the missing values, perform a
manual replacement, replace missing values with a global value, such as ’unknown’ or ’null’,
or replace them with some other statistically determined measurement, e.g., a measure of
central tendency, or the most probable value for that feature [37]. Each of these alternatives
has drawbacks. For example, replacing missing values with another statistically determined
value introduces bias into the dataset. This occurs because the replacement value may not
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be accurate. While manually replacing missing values may be accurate, it can also be time
consuming. Replacing values with a global variable is simplistic; however, the analyst must
be careful not to perceive connections between samples with the same replaced value.
For simplicity, BiSECT provides three options to the user: drop all data objects (i.e., samples)
that contain a missing value for any feature, replace all missing values with a user-provided
replacement value (with a default of 0), and ignore the missing values. The user should
select the option that is best suited to their intended use case.
Smoothing
After handling missing values, the next step is to smooth the dataset by reducing noise.
Noise essentially equates to variance in a measured variable [37]. Conventional methods to
reduce noise include binning, regression, and outlier analysis.
In binning, the objects are grouped into bins typically with neighboring objects, and
smoothed by replacing each value with the mean, median, or boundary for that bin. When
reducing noise using regression (e.g., via linear or multi-linear regression), the values are
replaced by a line of best fit. Noise in a dataset can also be reduced using various forms
of outlier analysis. Clustering, for example, can be used to quickly determine which data
objects fall outside of the primary cluster or clusters.
Since smoothing may or may not be appropriate, BiSECT does not perform any smoothing
by default. Additionally, standard smoothing techniques are not applicable to features that are
comprised of a set of text data (e.g., a set of unique strings in the sample). BiSECT provides
an optional function, B<>>C⌘(), that uses outlier analysis to perform smoothing. Users
may apply B<>>C⌘() to individual features, such as cyclomatic complexity, as appropriate
for their use case. An example of the cyclomatic complexity distribution before and after
smoothing is provided in Figure 4.13.
4.3.2 Data Transformation
After the dataset has been extracted and cleaned, the next steps involve performing one or
more transformations of the data. In a typical machine learning or data mining workflow
feature transformations include the aggregation and or normalization of features, and the
construction of new features.
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Figure 4.13. Cyclomatic complexity distribution before (left) and after (right)
applying the BiSECT B<>>C⌘() function
Aggregation
During the aggregation step, summary and aggregation operations are applied to the data to
create new features. BiSECT can be used to extract the McCabe cyclomatic complexity for
every function in every sample analyzed. Out of the box, BiSECT provides three aggregation
features related to cyclomatic complexity: minimum, maximum, and average cyclomatic
complexity. Each of these features are provided at the file level; Figure 4.14 provides
an example outcome of the application of the 0îîA4î0C8>=() function. Aggregating the
cyclomatic complexity in this manner could provide quantitative data to answer questions
such as, what is the maximum or minimum cyclomatic complexity for every file analyzed?
Or perhaps more insightful, what is the distribution of maximum cyclomatic complexity
across all samples analyzed, and does it di er for known vulnerable versus known benign
samples?
Normalization
During normalization, features are scaled to fit within a standardized or smaller range.
Normalizing the feature values forces all features to have an equal weight, and can prevent
numeric features with large ranges (e.g., entropy) from outweighing features with small
ranges (e.g., cyclomatic complexity). Treating all features equally, can also reduce the domain
expertise required to distinguish the importance of one feature from another. Common
normalization techniques include scaling (e.g., min-max, linear, or log scaling), clipping,
and using a z-score.
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Figure 4.14. Example outcome of BiSECT 0îîA4î0C8>=() function
BiSECT provides the user with the option of normalizing features using the function,
=>A<0;8I4(). =>A<0;8I4() applies min-max scaling using the following formula,
G0 =
G   min(G)
max(G)   min(G) (4.2)
Where G is the original value, and G0 is the normalized value.
Feature Construction
During the feature construction phase, new features are created from existing features.
The most noteworthy feature constructed by BiSECT (specifically for X86 binaries) is
5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>=. By default, BiSECT extracts the function sequence for each disassembled
function in a binary sample. To prepare the instruction sequences to be compatible with
machine learning algorithms, we perform a number of transformations on the original feature.
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First, we tokenize each instruction sequence into individual words, i.e., operands, mnemonics,
etc. Then, convert all characters to lowercase, and remove all punctuation and assembly size
qualifiers such as 3|>A3 and 1~C4. Finally, a number of standardizations are performed. For
example, each memory address is converted to addr, and all remaining numeric constants
are converted to num. The resulting instruction sequence loosely resembles X86, and thus
we refer to these as 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences. For example, the following transformation
would occur:
“SUB RSP,0x10” —> “sub rsp num”
An example of the process to construct the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= feature is provide in Section
4.5.2.
4.3.3 Feature Extension and General Workflow
We designed BiSECTwith extensibility in mind. All features extracted by BiSECT are written
to CSV files. We then leverage the Python Pandas library and Jupyter to perform many of
the core cleaning and transformation steps o ered by BiSECT. In this regard BiSECT is only
limited by features that can be output to a Pandas-compatible format (e.g., CSV, JSON,
XLSX, etc.). Finally, each of the individuals are combined into a single feature matrix, or
dataset. The final matrix completes the BiSECT workflow as depicted in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.15. BiSECT as a precursor to the typical machine learning workflow
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BiSECT has a number of use cases, however, each feature was specifically selected for its
applicability and potential for use in data mining and machine learning scenarios as described
in Section 4.2. Figure 4.15 depicts BiSECT as a precursor to a typical machine learning
workflow. Features are extracted and preprocessed using BiSECT, then the typical machine
learning workflow resumes. In Section 4.5 we demonstrate the ease with which one or more
of the features generated by BiSECT can be used to train a machine learning classifier.
4.3.4 BiSECT Limitations
BiSECT su ers from several limitations in practice. For many of the features extracted by
BiSECT Ghidra is first used to disassemble and analyze the binary file. In these instances
BiSECT will inherently adopt any of Ghidra’s limitations, of which several have been
documented [231]. Additionally, BiSECT uses static analysis to extract features, and thus,
samples analyzed by BiSECT are not executed. BiSECT makes no attempt to decompress,
decrypt, or deobfuscate the files it analyzes. When working with binaries of these types, the
features extracted by BiSECT may be sparse, null, or even misleading. For example, the use
of opaque predicates may result in the obfuscation of the program’s semantics [232], [233].
Learning models trained using code that has not been obfuscated may have a di cult time
properly predicting the labels for obfuscated code and vice versa.
4.4 Related Work
We partition the reviewed work into two categories: open source tools that can be used to
extract, clean, and transform one or more features from binaries, and deep learning techniques
to identify vulnerabilities in binaries. See Section 4.1.1 for a discussion on malware feature
extraction, cleaning, and transformation tools.
4.4.1 Feature Extraction, Cleaning, and Transformation (FECT) Tools
We refer to a tool that can be used to extract, clean, and transform one or more features
from a binary file in support of vulnerability analysis as a Feature Extraction, Cleaning,
and Transformation (FECT) tool. For example, the proposed tool, BiSECT, is a FECT tool.
However, with this criteria, the Strings utility is not a FECT tool as it does not clean or
transform any feature (i.e., strings) that it extracts [234]. Since the proposed work is open
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source, we specifically examine open source FECT tools. We were unable to identify any
open source FECT tools that meet the specified criteria. However, we identified numerous
tools that accomplish one or two of the steps (e.g., extraction, cleaning and transformation,
extraction and transformation, etc.). For example, the Strings utility can be used to extract
UNICODE or ASCII characters from files, and Objdump can be used to extract information
about one or more object files [235]. We also identified a couple of tools that do not
explicitly extract features from binary files, however they can be used to clean and transform
assembly code into features. Each of these tools assumes that the binary has already been
disassembled. For example, Asm2Vec can be used to convert assembly code into basic
blocks [146]. VDiscover applies static and dynamic information to extract features from
assembly code [40]. In VDiscover, the structure of the assembly is approximated using static
analysis to extract calls made to the standard C library. Dynamic analysis is then used to
extract the execution trace for the program including the arguments for the function calls
and the final state of the process if applicable [40]. BiSECT di ers from the related work in
three key ways. First, BiSECT is the only tool identified that strictly meets the criteria for a
FECT tool (extraction, cleaning and transformation). BiSECT leverages Ghidra to extract
features from binary samples directly. Second, BiSECT extracts and transforms additional
features not extracted by the reviewed work (e.g., function-level instruction sequences,
function-level cyclomatic complexity, etc.). Finally, BiSECT is the only tool that synthesizes
the extraction, cleaning, and transformation of numerous features that are commonly used in
binary vulnerability research.
4.4.2 Vulnerability Identification Using Deep Learning
In Section 4.5 we demonstrate one use case for BiSECT by providing an example application.
In this example, the output of BiSECT is used to train two deep learning classification models
and label functions as either vulnerable or not vulnerable. The application of deep learning
techniques to identify potential vulnerabilities in software has gained momentum in recent
years. A comprehensive survey of notable work in this area was published in 2020, by Lin,
et al. [28]. Of the techniques reviewed by Lin et. al., we identified three publications related
to work presented here. Two of these leverage binary code and one leverages source code to
support their work.
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Li et al. [31] proposed the use of code gadgets, or a number of semantically related lines of
source code. The code gadgets are transformed into vectors which are then used to predict
vulnerabilities using Bidirectional LSTM (BLSTM), the authors specifically evaluated
vulnerabilities related to stack-based bu er overflows (CWE-121). Ultimately, their design
was published as a deep learning-based vulnerability detection system called, VulDeePecker.
Both VulDeePecker and our work use a sequence of instructions as the basis for training a
classifier, however, VulDeePecker uses source code and was designed specifically to identify
bu er overflow vulnerabilities.
Lee et al. [30] proposed Instruction2vec, based on Word2Vec [236]. Similar to Word2Vec,
Instruction2vec creates a vector representation of some input using deep learning. Like the
proposed work Instruction2vec was designed to predict vulnerable functions in binary files
using a labeled test suite to train a learning model. However, Instruction2vec was trained
using only test cases from the Juliet dataset [142] that are related to stack-based bu er
overflow (CWE-121) vulnerabilities. In contrast, our work uses all C and C++ test cases in
the Juliet suite, and all test cases from the CB-Multios repository [141]— collectively, these
test cases span over 50 CWE types. Finally, Instruction2vec is used to identify similarity
between individual instructions, whereas our work utilizes the entire instruction sequence in
each function to train the classifier.
Le et al. [44] proposed the Maximal Divergence Sequential Auto-Encoder which leverages the
deep learning technique, Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE) with one-hot encoding to identify
vulnerabilities in binary code. The authors represent each binary as a sequence of machine
instructions, then apply VAE to encourage the samples to be maximally divergent. Similar
to [30], Maximal Divergence Sequential Auto-Encoder is based on the vector representation
for individual instructions, and therefore di ers from our work for the same reasons.
In addition to the work included in the survey, there are a few additional works that use
features extracted from binary files to create deep learning models. PalmTree is based on
the BERT model [237], and provides a pre-trained assembly language model for generating
instruction embeddings [238]. Asm2Vec is based on the Doc2vec [145] model, and uses
control flow information (including functions, basic blocks, and control flow graphs) to
provide an assembly code representation learning model [146]. We demonstrate that features
extracted with BiSECT can be used directly with existing representation models to achieve
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favorable results.
4.5 BiSECT to Support At-Scale Vulnerability Identifica-
tion in Binaries
Recent advances in the application of deep learning to speech recognition and machine
translation have demonstrated the high potential ability of such algorithms to understand
semantic relationships in natural languages [137]. This success has motivated a number of
researchers to explore the applicability of machine learning models to software security
and vulnerability research. A survey of data mining and conventional machine learning
techniques to support the identification and analysis of software vulnerabilities was published
in 2017 [27]. In this survey the authors reviewed 39 works published between 2001 and
2015. In 2020, Lin et al. conducted a survey of 19 works, published between 2013 and 2019,
that utilize deep learning and neural networks to support vulnerability research [28]. These
e orts provide the basis for the following BiSECT example application, using BiSECT to
Support at Scale Vulnerability Identification in Binaries.
4.5.1 Methodology
In the following section we present an overview of the proposed methodology for using
BiSECT in conjunction with existing sentence classification techniques to identify potentially
vulnerable functions in compiled code.
Overview
The basic hypothesis for this application is similar to that of Word2Vec [239] and
Doc2Vec [240]— if the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences for two functions have a similar
context, the meaning of these two functions also has a high-level of similarity. In turn, this
similarity can be used to identify potentially vulnerable functions, and ultimately to prioritize
vulnerability analysis. We compare the e cacy of two classification models: Doc2Vec and
fastText, when given the task of labeling functions as likely not vulnerable or potentially
vulnerable. To accomplish this task we conduct two experiments: Experiment 1, which
uses pure synthetic code, and Experiment 2, which uses hybrid-synthetic code. In these
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experiments we use BiSECT to extract the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence for roughly 5M
disassembled functions from 64K compiled C \ C++ programs.
Figure 4.16. BiSECT Workflow in Example Application 1
The high level workflow for this example application is illustrated in Figure 4.16. First,
BiSECT is used to extract the original instruction sequence from the compiled code (i.e.,
samples), which in turn is used to create the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence— The result is an
original dataset containing the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence for all functions in all samples.
We demonstrate that the original dataset su ers from class imbalance, and subsequently
balance it using two di erent techniques: random oversampling and random undersampling.
Each dataset is split into training (80%) and test (20%) sets. Doc2Vec and fastText are then
used with the training sets to develop a vector representation for the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>=
sequences. These embeddings are ultimately used to classify whether the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>=
sequences in the test sets are [potentially] vulnerable or [likely] not vulnerable. We compare
the actual labels with the predicted labels for each function in the test set to generate six
evaluation metrics: accuracy, precision, recall, False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative
Rate (FNR), and F1. Finally, we examine the e cacy of the two classification methods using
each dataset to identify potentially vulnerable functions.
Sentence Classification Techniques
In 2013 Mikolov et. al., introduced a novel Natural Language Processing (NLP) technique
called, Word2Vec. Word2Vec uses a neural network to represent words in vector space, and
ultimately to learn associations between individual words using a large corpus of text [239].
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Word2Vec provides the basis for many sentence classification techniques including both
Doc2Vec and fastText.
Mikolov et. al., expanded their word-embedding technique in 2014 to include variable-length
texts. Their updated technique, Doc2Vec is based on the concept of a Paragraph Vector,
that is, “an unsupervised algorithm that learns fixed-length feature representations from
variable-length pieces of texts, such as sentences, paragraphs, and documents” [240].
The original Doc2Vec paper has been sited over 7,400 times, and the algorithm has recent
success in cyber-relevant applications such as filtering malicious sourcecode [241], and the
extraction of cyber threat-related information from public sources [242].
In Doc2Vec, individual word vectors, or in our case, mnemonics, contribute to the prediction
task about the next word in the sentence, i.e., 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= in a function. In this regard,
the paragraph vectors in Doc2Vec inadvertently capture semantic information as they perform
the prediction task [240]. Each paragraph and each individual word is mapped to a unique
vector. For example, if there a # functions in the corpus, and " unique mnemonics in the
vocabulary, our task is to learn the vector for each function mapped to ? dimensions, and for
each word mapped to @ dimensions. The resulting model will have a total of #G? + "G@
parameters. Figure 4.17 describes the Doc2Vec framework using mnemonics as words, and
5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences as paragraphs, where ⇡ refers to a document, and , refers to
a word, which in our case equate to 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence and mnemonics.
Like Doc2Vec, fastText was also inspired by Word2Vec. fastText was developed and published
by Facebook Research in 2016 [243]. fastText can also be used to learn word represen-
tations and perform text classification for variable-length texts. When using fastText the
5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence for each function is represented as a bag of n-grams, which
preserve information about the order of each mnemonic in the instruction set. The average
of the mnemonic embeddings is taken, and subsequently the function representation is fed
into a linear classifier which in turn determines the appropriate label for that function. The
overall process is very similar to the Doc2Vec process outlined in Figure 4.17.
The primary di erences between the two models are that a vector corresponding to a
5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence in fastText is developed using a linear bag of words that is









Figure 4.17. Framework for vectorizing 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences using
Doc2Vec. Where ⇡ refers to a document, and , refers to a word, which in
our case equate to 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence and mnemonic
vector for the Doc2Vec model is developed by concatenating the word and paragraph vectors
for each paragraph (created using stochastic gradient descent with backpropogation [240]).
Moreover, Doc2Vec feeds whole, individual words into a neural network, while fastText first
decomposes each word into one or more #-grams. This technique provides fastText with the
advantage that rare words, or at least some of their components will be represented by the
model [243].
When using representation models like fastText and Doc2Vec each word is represented as
a vector. The goal when using these models is that semantically similar words will have
similar vector representations [240]. In both the fastText and Word2Vec representation models
the vectors for individual mnemonics and operands contribute to the final vector for each
5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence. The relationships between vectors can be plotted to reveal
relationships between them. It is important to note that the vector representations are directly
linked to the representation model— di erent models will result in di erent relationships.
For example, Figure 4.18 shows a dendrogram of the relationships between mnemonics and
operands learned using Word2Vec, while Figure 4.19 shows the resulting dendrogram using
fastText’s skipgram algorithm. These models were trained using identical training data, but
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with di erent underlying techniques. In both cases, the model resulted in close relationships
between semantically related mnemonics like 9=I (jump if not zero) and 9 I (jump if zero),













































































The vectors can also be used to create a scatter plot, where each node represents an individual
mnemonic or operand. For example, Figure 4.20 depicts, as a scatter plot, a subset of x86
mnemonics and operands. The vector representation for each node was created using fastText.
As expected, related mnemonics and operands such as those involved in floating-point or
string instructions are grouped together. Additionally, mnemonics or operands related to







































To evaluate the performance of each model and corresponding dataset, we first created a
confusion matrix for each test run. The confusion matrix can be used to display the true
positives (tp), false positives (fp), true negatives (tn), and false negatives (fn). For example,
the confusion matrix18 for the fastText test using random oversampling is displayed as a
heatmap in Figure 4.21. The larger the value, the darker the corresponding color in the
heatmap, and vice versa. Throughout this work, known vulnerable functions are labeled
True, all other functions are labeled False.
Figure 4.21. Confusion matrix (depicted as a heatmap) for the fastText model
using Juliet corpus with random oversampling
18In the confusion matrices, 4 indicates that the number is written in scientific notation, e.g., 4.1e+03 is
equal to 4,100.
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Information included in the confusion matrix is subsequently used to quantify the accuracy,
precision, recall, False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), and F1-measure.
These metrics are recorded for every test run in each experiment. Accuracy measures the
number of correct predictions made (C ? and C=). Precision provides a measure of correctness
for the positive predictions, and recall measures the true positive rate, i.e., how many
true vulnerabilities are predicted from the total vulnerabilities in the dataset. Finally, the
F1-measure accounts for both precision and recall. The six evaluation metrics are calculated
as follows,
Accuracy =
C ? + C=
C ? + 5 ? + 5 = + C= (4.3)
Precision =
C ?
C ? + 5 ? (4.4)
Recall =
C ?
C ? + 5 = (4.5)
False Positive Rate (FPR) =
5 ?
5 ? + C= (4.6)
False Negative Rate (FNR) =
5 =
C ? + 5 = (4.7)
F1-measure =
2 ⇤ ?A428B8>= ⇤ A420;;
?A428B8>= + A420;; (4.8)
For reference, a sound technique would provide a False Negative Rate (FNR) of 0, and a
complete technique would provide a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.
Class Imbalance
The imbalance of vulnerable to not vulnerable functions, known generally in machine learning
as class imbalance presents a recurring challenge to vulnerability prediction models [27],
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[137]. Imbalanced class data can be to the detriment of learning algorithms, as the learner
learns to recognize the majority class, in our case, not vulnerable functions, more frequently
than the minority class, i.e. , vulnerable functions [244].
There are a number of techniques to mitigate the class imbalance problem, most of
which involve either oversampling or undersampling [244]–[246]. The underlying method
in oversampling is often to replicate randomly selected samples from the minority class,
whereas in undersampling samples are randomly removed from the majority class. Examples
of oversampling techniques include simple random oversampling and SMOTE [247];
undersampling techniques include simple random undersampling, and undersampling using
cluster centroids or Tomek link.
In this example application, we observe the impact to the learning algorithms when they are
trained using the original unbalanced dataset verses balanced datasets. We create balanced
datasets using simple random oversampling and random undersampling. In all cases we
randomly split the data using 80% to train and 20% to test.
4.5.2 Experiment 1: Pure Synthetic Samples
In the first experiment, we used BiSECT to extract the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= for every function
in an open source dataset of pure synthetic code samples containing known vulnerabilities,
specifically, the Juliet C\C++ dataset. We then conducted a total of six tests using fastText
and Doc2Vec. Three tests were conducted for each model, one for each of the following
balanced or imbalanced version of the dataset:
1. Imbalanced— using original dataset
2. Balanced— using random undersampling
3. Balanced— using random oversampling
The overarching goal of this experiment was to assess whether fastText and/or Doc2Vec
provide an e ective method to identify potentially vulnerable functions in compiled binaries.
We were also curious about the impact that class imbalance had on the classification models.
We quantified the performance of each test using six evaluation metrics: accuracy, precision,
recall, FPR, FNR, TPR, TNR, and F1-measure. The optimal overall performance was




The Juliet C, C/C++ and Java test suites were developed by the National Security Agency
(NSA) Center for Assured Software (CAS) to assess the capabilities and limitations of static
analysis tools [142]. Each test case in the suite contains at least one known, synthetic,
security flaw. The latest version of the Juliet test suites contain over 100K individual test
cases, as outlined in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5. Juliet C#, C/C++ and Juliet Java descriptions
Dataset Language Total Programs Label Granularity Known Vulnerabilities
Juliet C# C# 28,942 Function 28,942
Juliet C/C++ C/C++ 64,099 Function 64,099
Juliet Java Java 28,881 Function 28,881
The Juliet test suite was engineered to contain vulnerable functions; every intentional or
known vulnerability in the corpus is labeled to specify the vulnerabilities associated CWE
and whether that function is good or bad. Despite its limitations19 the Juliet test suite contains
a significant repository of labeled, known vulnerable (i.e., bad) and known benign (i.e.,
good) functions.
Fuzzy Instructions
Each test case in the Juliet C/C++ (v. 1.2) corpus was compiled using GCC (v. 9.3.0) on an
Ubuntu 64-bit (v. 18.04.4) virtual machine. After compilation, we used BiSECT, which in
turn leverages Ghidra, to extract a number of features from each compiled test case in the
Juliet dataset. For this experiment we were particularly interested in the instruction set for
each function, so that feature was isolated for further analysis.
To prepare the instruction sets to be compatible with the deep learning algorithms, Doc2Vec
and fastText we performed a number of preprocessing steps using BiSECT. First, we tokenized
the text into individual words, i.e., mnemonics and operands, and converted all characters to
19see Section 2.4.3
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lowercase. We also removed all punctuation, and assembly size qualifiers such as 3|>A3
and 1~C4. Finally, we performed a number of standardization’s. For example, each memory
addresses was converted to addr, each conditional and non conditional jump was converted to
jump, and all remaining numeric constants were converted to num. The resulting instruction
set loosely resembles x86, and thus we refer to the resulting feature as 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>=































After preprocessing the data, we collected the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences for roughly 4.8M
functions. This included 4.3M that were not vulnerable (for this experiment we assumed that
any function not explicitly labeled as bad was in fact good), and 451K that were vulnerable.
The Juliet test suite contains a significant amount of duplicate code. We chose to remove
all identical functions, that is, any function that had both a name and 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>=
sequence that was identical to another function. After removing identical functions, 299K
not vulnerable, and 61K vulnerable functions remained. The distribution before and after
removing identical functions is described in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Function breakdown in Juliet C/C++ dataset
Vulnerable Not Vulnerable
Total Functions 451,982 4,344,057
Total Unique Functions 61,468 299,270
Class Imbalance
Even after removing duplicate functions, the ratio of vulnerable to not vulnerable functions
was severely imbalanced, 83% not vulnerable to 17% vulnerable. We used the over and under
sampling methods described in Section 4.5.1 to balance the dataset. Figure 4.23 depicts the
distribution of vulnerable (True) to not vulnerable (False) functions in the original dataset,
dataset using oversampling, and dataset using undersampling.
Evaluation Metrics
Table 4.7 describes the accuracy, precision, and recall metrics for each of the tests using
Doc2Vec and fastText and the Juliet datasets. Using a balanced dataset provided an overall
increase in accuracy, precision, and recall values. With both fastText and Doc2Vec, rebalancing
the dataset using random oversampling provided the highest accuracy, precision, and recall
values. The highest accuracy overall, 82%, was seen using fastText with the original
unbalanced dataset.
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Figure 4.23. Distribution of samples in original and balanced Juliet C/C++
datasets
Table 4.7. Accuracy, precision, recall, false positive rate (FPR), false negative
rate (FNR), and F1 metrics for the original and balanced Juliet datasets
using Doc2Vec (deep learning) and fastText (linear classification)
Experiment Accuracy Precision Recall FPR FNR F1
Doc2Vec— Juliet
Original (unbalanced) 0.6517 0.2417 0.4964 0.3167 0.5036 0.3251
Random Undersampling 0.6127 0.5924 0.7316 0.5070 0.2684 0.6547
Random Oversampling 0.7089 0.6838 0.7810 0.3637 0.2190 0.7292
fastText— Juliet
Original (unbalanced) 0.8235 0.4667 0.3118 0.0725 0.6882 0.3739
Random Undersampling 0.7203 0.7463 0.6706 0.2296 0.3294 0.7064

















































































































The greatest performance overall was seen when using fastText or Doc2Vec with a dataset
balanced using random oversampling. We were curious about whether there were observ-
able di erences in the performance metrics reported when examining specific types of
vulnerabilities. To this end, we used fastText andDoc2Vec with a balanced (with random
oversampling) dataset and assessed the performance metrics for test cases related to each of
the 10 CWE Pillars20. Tables 4.9 and 4.8 provide the results from these tests. For reference,
the description corresponding to each of the 10 CWE Pillars is provided in Table 4.10 [172].
Table 4.8. Performance metrics by CWE Pillar, Doc2Vec with random over-
sampling
CWE Pillar Accuracy Precision Recall FPR FNR F1
CWE 435 0.8855 0.0575 0.7667 0.1134 0.2333 0.1070
CWE 664 0.7030 0.6328 0.7721 0.3511 0.2279 0.6955
CWE 682 0.7167 0.5906 0.8052 0.3366 0.1948 0.6814
CWE 691 0.7336 0.5686 0.7834 0.2907 0.2166 0.6589
CWE 697 0.9252 0.0201 1.0000 0.0749 0.0000 0.0394
CWE 703 0.7835 0.6085 0.7983 0.2229 0.2017 0.6906
CWE 707 0.7112 0.5082 0.7852 0.3200 0.2148 0.6170
CWE 710 0.7001 0.5030 0.7727 0.3314 0.2273 0.6093
Table 4.9. Performance metrics by CWE Pillar, fastText with random over-
sampling
CWE Pillar Accuracy Precision Recall FPR FNR F1
CWE 435 0.9317 0.1158 1.0000 0.0689 0.0000 0.2076
CWE 664 0.7934 0.7705 0.7544 0.1760 0.2456 0.7623
CWE 682 0.8111 0.7302 0.7900 0.1761 0.2100 0.7589
CWE 691 0.8905 0.7899 0.9081 0.1181 0.0919 0.8449
CWE 697 0.9805 0.0729 1.0000 0.0195 0.0000 0.1358
CWE 703 0.9646 0.9712 0.9098 0.0117 0.0902 0.9395
CWE 707 0.8719 0.7279 0.9064 0.1427 0.0936 0.8074
CWE 710 0.8492 0.7031 0.8688 0.1593 0.1312 0.7772
20CWE Pillars were described in detail in Chapter 3
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Table 4.10. CWE Pillar and descriptions (CWE Pillars 284 and 693 are
not included in the Juliet C\C++ dataset, and thus, not included in this
experiment)
CWE Pillar Description
CWE 284 Improper Access Control
CWE 435 Improper Interaction Between Multiple Correctly-Behaving Entities
CWE 664 Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
CWE 682 Incorrect Calculation
CWE 691 Insu cient Control Flow Management
CWE 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
CWE 697 Incorrect Comparison
CWE 703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
CWE 707 Improper Neutralization
CWE 710 Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
The greatest performance metrics overall were achieved when using fastText with samples
related to CWE Pillar 703, Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions— 96.5%
accuracy, 97.1% precision, and 91.0% recall, with a false positive rate of 1.1%, false negative
rate of 9.0% and F1 of 94.0%. These results are encouraging and indicate that this may be an
e ective method to identify vulnerabilities related to the improper handling of exceptional
conditions.
Process and Discussion
In this experiment, we used BiSECT to extract the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence for every
function in an open source repository of pure synthetic code samples containing known
vulnerabilities, i.e., the Juliet C\C++ dataset. Then, we conducted six tests using two
supervised learning models, fastText and Doc2Vec (three tests for each model):
1. Original unbalanced dataset
2. Dataset balanced using random undersampling
3. Dataset balanced using random oversampling
The overarching goal of this experiment was to assess whether fastText and/or Doc2Vec
provided an e ective method to identify potentially vulnerable functions in compiled binaries.
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We quantified the performance of each test using six evaluation metrics: accuracy, precision,
recall, FPR, FNR, TPR, TNR, and F1-measure. The optimal overall performance was
achieved by using the fastText model in conjunction with the dataset balanced using random
oversampling of the minority set.
These performance metrics seemed particularly promising for vulnerabilities related to CWE
Pillar-703, Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions. In this case, functions
in the dataset were labeled with 96.5% accuracy, 97.1% precision, and 91.0% recall, a false
positive rate of 1.1%, false negative rate of 9.0%, and F1 of 94.0%.
We were encouraged to see how well this model performed using code outside of the Juliet
suite. Unfortunately, when we attempted to use the same model to identify potentially
vulnerable functions in another dataset, specifically, the CB-Multios dataset [141], the
results were significantly less exceptional— on that dataset, functions were labeled with
roughly 88% accuracy, but only 15% precision. We believe the disconnect in performance
is directly correlated to the sophistication of the test cases in each repository. While every
test case in both the Juliet and CB-Multios datasets was engineered to contain at least one
known vulnerability, the CB-Multios test cases were designed to approximate real-world
applications [140], while the Juliet cases were not [142]. The Juliet corpus has been criticized
for being overly simplistic and redundant [30], [137] In this regard, we can think of the
Juliet cases as pure-synthetic test cases, and the CB-Multios test cases as hybrid-synthetic.
The result is that models trained using pure-synthetic, simplistic test cases were not able
to precisely label functions from hybrid-synthetic or more complex test cases. Ultimately,
these results led us to turn the experiment on its head and train new learning models using
hybrid-synthetic test cases. The subsequent experiment, Experiment 2, is described next.
4.5.3 Experiment 2: Hybrid-synthetic
Experiment 2 was conducted following the same procedure specified in Experiment 1 with one
primary di erence, the CB-Multios corpus was used instead of the Juliet corpus. Unlike the
Juliet corpus, each binary in the CB-Multios corpus was specifically designed to approximate
real software, and includes at least one documented and exploitable vulnerability [140].
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Dataset
At the conclusion of the CGC, DARPA released the entire corpus of challenge binaries to the
public. Each binary was specifically designed to approximate real software, and includes at
least one documented and exploitable vulnerability. The initial release of binaries was only
compatible with the custom CGC DECREE operating system; researchers at TrailofBits
modified and republished the binaries to be compatible with common operating environments
including Windows, Macintosh, and Linux [141]. The TrailofBits repository of challenge
binaries provides a relevant basis to demonstrate the data cleaning and transformation steps
taken by BiSECT.
The author of each challenge binary provided a detailed description of the known vulnera-
bilities included in the sample, including an associated CWE classification. Using gcc on
an Ubuntu virtual machine, we compiled 285 known vulnerable test cases or samples from
the TrailofBits CB-Multios repository, and 285 patched (non-vulnerable) versions of the
samples. We then used BiSECT to extract, clean, and transform the fuzzy instruction set for
every function in all samples.
Unlike the Juliet corpus, which contains function level labels, known vulnerabilities in the
CB-Multios corpus are labeled at the file level. However, users can manually query the
source code for the presence of ifdef PATCHED which will reveal functions where known
vulnerabilities reside. For example, the author of the challenge called, BitBlaster, indicates
that the test case contains vulnerabilities related to CWE-284, Access of Uninitialized Pointer
and CWE-476, Null Pointer Dereference. One method to label functions as vulnerable or
not is to manually query the repository for the presence of ifdef PATCHED. We developed
another, more automated method. This method was discussed extensively in Section 3.3.3.
For the purpose of this experiment we label all ’unchanged’ functions as ’not vulnerable’.
Using the proposed method we identified and labeled 888 vulnerable functions, and 136,842
non-vulnerable functions in the CB-Multios corpus21.
Class Imbalance
Like the Juliet dataset, the original CB-Multios dataset exhibits class imbalance, that is, an
imbalance in the number of vulnerable and not vulnerable functions contained in the corpus.
21https://github.com/Kayla0x41/ghidraheadless18=4G?>AC
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The original dataset included 136,842 not vulnerable, and 888 vulnerable functions.
Figure 4.25. Distribution of samples in original and balanced CB-Multios
datasets
As in Experiment 1, we used two rebalancing techniques to create a dataset with an equal
number of vulnerable (True) and not vulnerable (False) functions— random oversampling
of the minority class (i.e., vulnerable functions), and random undersampling of the majority
class (i.e., not-vulnerable functions). Figure 4.25 depicts the distribution of function in the
final dataset for each test run.
Evaluation Metrics
Each test was evaluated using the same six metrics that were used in Experiment 1- accuracy,
precision, recall, FPR, FNR, TPR, TNR, and F1. Table 4.11 provides the evaluation metrics
for each of the test runs.
The evaluation metrics for each test is also displayed graphically in Figure 4.26. In this graph,
we have also included a “Perfect Score” for reference. If we follow the line for the “Perfect
Score” in the graph, we can quickly observe that the greatest performance was consistently
achieved via the fastText model with the dataset balanced using random oversampling. In
this case, functions were identified with 96.4% accuracy, 97.8% precision, 94.8% recall, a
FPR of 2.1%, FNR of 5.2% , and F1 of 96.3%. These results are consistent with the results
140
Table 4.11. Accuracy, precision, recall, false positive rate (FPR), false negative
rate (FNR), and F1 metrics for the original and balanced CB-Multios datasets
using Doc2Vec (deep learning) and fastText (linear classification)
Experiment Accuracy Precision Recall FPR FNR F1
Doc2Vec— CB-Multios
Original (unbalanced) 0.9921 0.1077 0.0422 0.0021 0.9578 0.0606
Random Undersampling 0.8202 0.8647 0.7819 0.1369 0.2181 0.8212
Random Oversampling 0.7672 0.8345 0.6634 0.1301 0.3366 0.7392
fastText— CB-Multios
Original (unbalanced) 0.9889 0.1911 0.2590 0.0066 0.7410 0.2199
Random Undersampling 0.4803 1.0000 0.0160 0.0000 0.9840 0.0314
Random Oversampling 0.9635 0.9778 0.9481 0.0213 0.0519 0.9627

































































































































In this experiment, we first compiled then disassembled the CB-Multios test cases. Then,
we used BiSECT to extract and curate the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence for each function
in all samples. We used the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequence to train the Doc2Vec and fastText
learning models, then assessed the e cacy of each model using a test set and six evaluation
metrics. As in Experiment 1 we conducted three tests, one for each balanced or imbalanced
dataset. Ultimately the greatest performance was also achieved when using fastText and
a dataset balanced with random oversampling. In this test, functions were identified with
96.4% accuracy, 97.8% precision, 94.8% recall, a FPR of 2.1%, FNR of 5.2% , and F1 of
96.3%.
The results from the Experiment 2, in which hybrid-synthetic code was used to train the
classifier, are significantly more encouraging than the results from Experiment 1, which
used pure-synthetic code. Experiment 2 demonstrates that fastText can be trained using
the function-level 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= set for disassembled x86 binaries, and that such a
classifier provides an e ective method to label functions as potentially vulnerable or likely
not vulnerable. Furthermore, these experiments demonstrate the ease with which BiSECT
can be used to extract and curate features to train various machine learning models.
4.6 BiSECT to Perform Test Suite Reduction
In Chapter 3 we reviewed a number of open source datasets that collectively contain over
120 thousand test cases. A stratified sample of vulnerability instances and weakness types as
they have occurred in the wild throughout the past decade indicates that a total of 2,301 test
cases are needed for BVATT. Table 4.12 shows the number of available and required test
cases for each strata, i.e., CWE Pillar.
In the following section we demonstrate how BiSECT can be used to identify the least similar
test cases from a test suite, and propose this method to identify a representative subset of test
cases needed for the Benchmark [22]22
22See Chapter 3 for a complete description of BVATT and additional context for this Section
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Table 4.12. Available open-source test cases












Our objective is to reduce the number of test cases to the number required by the stratified
sample for each CWE pillar. One approach to achieve this is to select the least similar test
cases, so that BVATT contains the most diverse set of test cases. This begs the question, can
we determine whether two test cases are similar?
Rice’s Theorem states that all non-trivial properties of recursively enumerable languages are
undecidable. Undecidable in this case means that there does not exist a Turing machine that
can solve this problem in the general case. An analog of Rice’s Theorem helps us discern
whether we should even attempt to decide if two programs are semantically similar. Hopcroft
states that [248],
any nontrivial property that involves what the program does (rather than a lexical
or syntactic property of the program itself) must be undecidable.
Ergo, determining whether two programs are semantically similar can be reduced to
determining whether a program will halt, and thus is undecidable. All hope is not lost,
however. By changing the scope our question we can pivot from an undecidable problem,
to one that is certainly surmountable. Rather than examining the semantic properties of a
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program, we will instead compare the similarities between the feature vectors for functions
within each program.
This is precisely what many machine learning classifiers, e.g., :-nearest neighbors, attempt
to achieve. By representing each sample as a feature vector, we can plot each vector as a
point in an =-dimensional space, where = is equal to the number of distinct features in the
vector. We can then calculate the geometric distance between any two points, or in our case,
binary samples. The closer two points are the more similar the feature vectors are for those
samples. Or, in the context of test suite reduction, the farther two points are from one another,
the more dissimilar the feature vectors are for those samples.
There are several methods to calculate the distance between two points; in general, a distance
metric must satisfy the following four properties [249]:
1. The distance must never be negative
2. The distance between two identical feature vectors, G and ~, is zero
3. The distance from G to ~ is the same as the distance from ~ to G
4. The metric must satisfy the triangular inequality: 3 (G, ~) + 3 (~, I) >= 3 (G, I)
4.6.2 Euclidean Distance
One method to determine the distance between points in an =-dimensional space is to calculate
the Euclidean distance, or the hypotenuse between the points. In a two-dimensional space,
the hypotenuse can be calculated using the Pythagorean theorem, and can be generalized for
=-dimensions as follows,
3 (ÆG, Æ~) = kÆG   Æ~k =
q
(G1   ~1)2 + (G2   ~2)2 . . . (G=   ~=)2 (4.9)
More succinctly, the Euclidean distance between two samples, G and ~, can be calculated as
follows [249]:
3⇢ (x, y) =
q
⌃=8=1 (G8   ~8)
2 (4.10)
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When a feature is comprised of scalar values, e.g., maximum complexity or number of
functions, the function to calculate the distance between G8 and ~8 merely involves the
subtraction of scalar values. However, when a feature contains a set or list of values the
the function to calculate the distance between G8 and ~8 must include set operations. The
Jaccard distance or Jaccard dissimilarity coe cient can be used to calculate the distance
between features containing a set of values. The formula to calculate the Jaccard distance
between two sets, A and B is as follows [37]:
3  ( , ⌫) = 1     ( , ⌫) =
|  [ ⌫|   |  \ ⌫ |
|  [ ⌫ | (4.11)
The Jaccard distance measures dissimilarity between two sets (opposed to the Jaccard Index
which measures similarity), and is obtained by dividing the di erence of the sizes of the
set union and set intersection, by the size of the set union. Consider the feature, Unique
Strings, which specifies a list of unique strings for every binary sample. To calculate the
di erence between each set of strings, we could apply the Jaccard distance formula. Figure
4.27 provides a short example that includes the unique strings feature for three binary samples.
The Jaccard Distance column shows the Jaccard distance from each sample to every other
sample in the dataset. The Jaccard distance from any sample to itself is zero. The Jaccard
distance from B0<?;40 to B0<?;41 is 0.5, and the calculation is as follows:
3  (B0<?;40, B0<?;41) =
|B0<?;40 [ B0<?;41|   |B0<?;40 \ B0<?;41|
|B0<?;40 [ B0<?;41| = 0.5 (4.12)
Figure 4.27. Jaccard Distance calculation for set of unique strings
In the following section we explore how BiSECT can be used to extract features from the
binary samples, then apply the Euclidean, scalar, and Jaccard distance functions to select the
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least similar test cases for BVATT.
4.6.3 Data Cleaning and Transformation
After compiling the samples, BiSECT was used to extract eight raw features from the
compiled binaries including: strings, 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>=s, #-grams, Shannon entropy, total
functions, internal functions, external functions, and the McCabe cyclomatic complexity for
each function in the sample. BiSECT was also used to construct additional features from the
set of raw features, as described in Section 4.3. After extracting the features BiSECT was
used to clean and transform all features into feature vectors, so that the dataset would be
compatible with two popular visualization and clustering techniques. BiSECT outputs the
extraction of each feature to a CSV file for easy processing. The BiSECT extraction resulted
in 12 individual CSV files, which we then read as Pandas DataFrames [174].
After combining the features into a comprehensive feature vector for each sample, the next
step is to compute the Euclidean distance between each sample, which in turn is used to
create an #G# similarity matrix including all samples in the dataset. A similarity matrix is
simply the inverse of the distance matrix— in a similarity matrix the diagonal is equal to 1,
as a sample has maximum similarity with itself. The resulting similarity matrix will include
the pairwise distance values, which are stored as a symmetric matrix. The distance between
samples   and ⌫ is the same as the distance between samples ⌫ and  . Figure 4.28 shows
the a subset of the resulting symmetric similarity matrix for 469 test cases associated with
CWE 703. In this matrix the closer a value is to 1, the more similar the feature sets were for
the respective test cases, and vice versa.
Figure 4.28. Similarity matrix for 469 test cases associated with CWE 703
147
In the next section, we demonstrate how the similarity matrix can be used in conjunction
with clustering algorithms and displayed visually to enable the identification of similar and
dissimilar test cases.
4.6.4 Cluster Analysis and Visualization
To illustrate the similarity of each sample, we can display the distance matrix in a number of
ways. For example, the matrix can be displayed as a heatmap, where darker tiles indicate less
similarity (i.e., a greater Euclidean distance between the samples), while lighter tiles indicate
greater overlap between feature vectors for sample pairs. Figure 4.29 shows an example
heatmap of the similarity matrix for 469 test cases associated with CWE-703, Improper
Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions. The Figure also provides a zoomed view that
clearly shows the diagonal values— in which samples are compared to themselves and have
the greatest similarity.
The similarity matrix can also be used to identify clusters of similar test cases. During
cluster analysis similar data objects are grouped into clusters based on similarity [250],
[251]. One author states that [251],
clustering is useful in several exploratory pattern-analysis, grouping, decision-
making, and machine-learning situations, including data mining, document
retrieval, image segmentation, and pattern classification.
Intuitively, objects in di erent clusters are less similar then objects in the same cluster.
Cluster analysis is often used in the context of unsupervised learning, where analysis is
performed on unlabeled samples and used to organize the data into meaningful clusters based
strictly on patterns in the data. There are numerous clustering algorithms that organize data
into either hierarchies or partitions. Hierarchical clustering algorithms produce a dendrogram
that represents the data as a nested series of partitions [251]. In 1963, Joe Ward described
the basic procedure to create hierarchical clusters from an #x# matrix. In 1967, Stephen
Johnson generalized Ward’s procedure, and outlined the process to identify a hierarchical
cluster given a similarity (or distance matrix). Given an #x# matrix Johnson’s hierarchical
clustering scheme (HCS) is as follows [252]:
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Figure 4.29. Heatmap depicting test case similarity based on extracted features
and Euclidean distance. Darker tiles indicate a lower similarity association
(i.e., a greater Euclidean distance between the samples); lighter tiles indicate
stronger similarity between samples
1. Assign each data object to its own cluster, thus, given # objects, there will initially be
# clusters
2. Identify the closest pair of clusters, and merge those into a single cluster, the total
number of clusters is now #   1
3. Recompute the distance between each cluster (including the newly merged cluster)
4. Repeat steps 2-3 until all # items have been clustered into a single cluster of size #
We followed Johnson’s procedure to cluster the 469 sample test cases related to CWE-703.
Figure 4.30 depicts a Seaborn hierarchical clustermap of test case similarity using Euclidean
distances. This clustermap includes both a heatmap and hierarchical dendrogram [253]. The
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dendrogram illustrates the clusters, and is shown on the upper --axis. The numbers along the
- and . axis represent test case identifiers; the cases are reordered to support visualization
of the clusters.
Cluster analysis can be used to down-select test cases for BVATT, by selecting the least
similar test cases in an iterative fashion. In other words, the two test cases with the greatest
distance between them will be selected, and so on, until the needed number of cases for each
strata has been selected. This method ensures that BVATT will be comprised of test cases
exhibiting the greatest di erences in their feature sets, and thus, VATTs will be assessed on












































































































































































Furthermore, to identify C test cases (in the case of BVATT C = 2, 301) with the greatest
distance between their feature vectors, and ultimately to select the most diverse test cases
for BVATT, we can leverage the convenient matrix format generated by BiSECT. We simply
convert the symmetric similarity matrix into a distance matrix, then convert it to a lower or
upper triangle, and finally, apply a simple function to select C values. We provide an example
of this technique in Listing 4.2:
4.6.5 Conclusion
The proposed method to perform test suite reduction for BVATT is conducted almost entirely
using BiSECT. BiSECT extracts, cleans, and transforms the features, creates the feature
vectors and corresponding matrices, and performs the distance calculations Test cases
selected using this method will have the least similar feature vectors, and ensure that BVATT
is comprised of the most diverse (from a feature perspective) set of test cases.
4.7 Summary
In this Chapter we introduced a new tool, BiSECT. BiSECT enables researchers to synthesize
the extraction, cleaning, and transformation of a number of common features from compiled
binaries. Ultimately, BiSECT reduces the domain expertise and manual e ort required to
complete the feature extraction, cleaning, and transformation steps in support of vulnerability
analysis using machine learning and data mining techniques.
To demonstrate the utility of BiSECT, we provided two example applications in Sections
4.5 and 4.6. In Section 4.5, we use BiSECT to extract, clean, and transform roughly 5M
disassembled x86 functions from 64K compiled C \ C++ programs. We then use the output of
BiSECT to compare the e cacy of two representation models and corresponding classifiers,
fastText and Doc2Vec, when they are given the task of labeling potentially vulnerable
functions. In Section 4.6, we use BiSECT to identify and eliminate similar test cases in
support of BVATT.
In the first example application we measured the impact that unbalanced and balanced
training data (using random over or under sampling) can have on machine learning classifiers.
We observed that classifiers trained using vulnerability datasets that were balanced using




3 for every test case:
4 get coordinates for the least similar test case to this one
5 retrieve the actual value using the coordinates
6 add the test case coordinates and actual value to dict.
7 e.g., (0, 443): 0.6
8 return the final dict of max values
9 '''
10 max_vals = {}
11 for index, row in enumerate(tri_upper_no_diag):
12 max_row_coordinates = list([index, (np.argpartition(row,
-1)[-1:])[0]])õ!
13 max_row_val = (row[max_row_coordinates])[1]
14 max_vals[tuple(max_row_coordinates)] = max_row_val
15 return max_vals
16
17 def n_max(max_vals, t):
18 # return the t largest values from the dict of max values
19 t_largest = nlargest(t, max_vals.items(), key=lambda i: i[1])
20 return t_largest
21
22 distance_matrix = 1-similarity_matrix # convert similarity to distance
matrixõ!
23 max_vals = max_distance(tri_upper_no_diag) # get a dict of max distances
24 t = 37 # specify how many test cases are needed
25 t_largest = n_max(max_vals, t) # get the t least similar test cases
Listing 4.2: Example implementation of selecting C least similar test cases
datasets or datasets balanced using random undersampling. We also demonstrated that
classifiers trained using pure synthetic data (i.e., Juliet) do a poor job labeling function level
code as likely vulnerable or likely not vulnerable in more realistic code (i.e., CB-Multios).
Finally, the metrics achieved by fastText when trained using the CB-Multios dataset (balanced
using random oversampling) were nearly perfect across the board. This success not only
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demonstrates how easily features extracted by BiSECT can be used to train models such as
these, but also that the models themselves provide an e ective launching point for further
vulnerability research.
Collectively, these example applications demonstrate the ease in which BiSECT can be used
to synthesize the extraction, cleaning, and transformation of features from binary files in




This Chapter presents a summary of our work. We begin with a review of the major challenges
addressed throughout this research. This is followed by a discussion of our findings, and
finally, we conclude with recommendations for future research.
5.1 Summary
5.1.1 Challenges and Solutions
The fundamental challenge and corresponding motivation for this work is simple, but
mountainous:
Software pervades nearly every aspect of our lives today, and so do its vulnerabilities.
From this, a mountain range of challenges arises.
Hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities have been reported to the CVE. In spite of billions
of dollars allocated to cybersecurity, data exfiltration and ransomware attacks persist [14],
[15]. The question remains:
How can we identify and reduce software vulnerabilities?
The number of specialists able to perform manual vulnerability testing is eclipsed by the
amount and variety of software there is to secure. Static, dynamic, and hybrid testing can
be used to identify vulnerabilities in software in a more automated fashion. Hundreds
of vulnerability analysis tools and techniques have entered the market. Researchers and
consumers rely on VATTs to amplify the vulnerability analysis process.
Throughout this work, two major challenges were addressed. We again summarize these
challenges and our solutions as follows.
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5.1.2 Challenge 1
There is no comprehensive method to assess the e cacy of VATTs. We have no comparative
metrics of the types of vulnerabilities each tool can or cannot find, how quickly they can
do so, or the number of false positives they report. So, when a consumer wants to use a
vulnerability analysis tool, they have no method of comparing the alternatives to determine
which is a good choice for a specific use case. When a developer wants to modify their tool
or enter the market with a new one, no standard method is available to compare their VATT
against existing ones. Consequently, consumers and developers compare tools in a disjointed
fashion, which can result in misinformation, subjectivity, redundancy, and inconsistency.
Based on the limitations of existing datasets, and the absence of a community-accepted
benchmark we determined that the community is in need of an overarching framework to
guide the implementation of BVATTs. The framework for BVATT should include both the
core characteristics of the benchmark, and metrics that can be used to quantitatively compare
VATTs.
Solution 1
To address the first challenge, we provided a framework for BVATT in Chapter 3. Before
creating the framework, we examined the limitations of existing datasets containing known
vulnerabilities. We then explored lessons learned from other computing benchmarks. We used
these lessons to identify key characteristics for BVATT. We determined that BVATT should
be repeatable, reproducible, fair, and verifiable. After detailing each of these characteristics,
we investigated what it would require for BVATT to be representative of reality. To this end,
we determined that a stratified random sample of CVEs and corresponding CWEs would
provide an excellent representation of known vulnerability instances and types that have
occurred in the wild throughout the past decade. Finally, we explored methods to leverage
test cases in existing vulnerability datasets for BVATT. In Section 3.3.6 we demonstrated
that existing methods to identify and eliminate similar test cases may require significant
manual e ort. Thus, we sought a more automated solution. This research ultimately led us
to create a new tool, BiSECT. On the journey to create BiSECT we were confronted with the
second challenge addressed by this work.
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5.1.3 Challenge 2
There is no tool to synthesize the at scale extraction, cleaning, and transformation of features
commonly used in data mining and machine learning-based vulnerability analysis Thus,
current research in this area is limited to a niche group of computer scientists with the
requisite domain expertise in machine learning and binary vulnerability analysis. This
disconnect acts as barrier to both security and machine learning researchers, and ultimately
limits advancements in a promising area of vulnerability analysis.
Instead, we need to get to a place where a vulnerability analyst can succinctly extract
common features from hundreds of binaries using a single tool. The tool should also clean
and transform those features so that they’re compatible with machine learning and data
mining techniques.
Solution 2
To address the second challenge, we introduced a new tool, dubbed BiSECT, in Chapter 4.
BiSECT enables researchers to synthesize the extraction, cleaning, and transformation of a
number of common features from compiled binaries. Ultimately, BiSECT reduces the domain
expertise required to complete the feature extraction, cleaning, and transformation steps in
support of vulnerability analysis leveraging machine learning and data mining techniques.
To demonstrate the utility of BiSECT, we provided two example applications. In the first
example, we used BiSECT to extract, clean, and transform roughly 5M disassembled x86
functions from 64K compiled C \ C++ programs. We then used the output of BiSECT to
compare the e cacy of two representation models and corresponding classifiers, fastText
and Doc2Vec, when they are given the task of labeling potentially vulnerable functions.
Finally, we returned to the work we began in Chapter 3, and demonstrated how BiSECT can
be used to identify and eliminate similar test cases in a test suite. This approach can be used
to select the most diverse test cases for BVATT.
5.2 Ongoing and Future Work
In Chapter 3 we provided a framework for BVATT, but there remains much work to be done
including the actual implementation and maintenance of a benchmark. One of the most
significant challenges to this area is the identification of real-world benchmark problems.
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We stand in solidarity with the numerous researchers who have stated that the vulnerability
research community is in need of a standard dataset of real-world vulnerabilities [22], [25],
[27], [28]. As a step towards this goal, we proposed a batch method to identify the di erences
(i.e., di ) in the original and patched versions of binary files using Ghidra and Python.
During the di  process, the original function corresponding to any function modified during
a patch is deemed vulnerable (the updated function is deemed not vulnerable). Using the
CB-Multios corpus as an example, we demonstrated how our technique can be leveraged
to identify and label vulnerabilities at a function level. In support of the development of
BVATT and a standard dataset of known vulnerabilities, we have made our code publicly
available via GitHub.
There remains a disparity between vulnerability researchers using source code versus
compiled code. We discussed this imbalance extensively in Chapter 4. To summarize, of
58 publications reviewed in two major surveys [of machine learning and data mining based
vulnerability analysis], a mere 3% used binary code to support their work [27], [28]. Binary
vulnerability analysis using machine learning and data mining remains a niche area of
research, yet there are situations when binary analysis is necessary, e.g., a user may need
to validate that properties proven by analyzing a program’s source code still hold after the
program has been compiled, or they may not have access to a program’s source code [21],
[47], [49], [50]. We attribute this disparity to the inverse relationship between semantic
information and level of di culty. That is to say that as semantic information decreases, the
level of di culty of analyzing a sample for vulnerabilities increases.
To support and encourage research in binary code vulnerability analysis we provided the
BiSECT tool. Our hope is that BiSECT will be used as both a research and educational aid.
We see many opportunities for future work with BiSECT. For example, BiSECT could be
leveraged to create open source courseware on vulnerability analysis using data mining and
machine learning. Additionally, recent surveys indicate that graph-based methods to identify
vulnerabilities in source and binary code show encouraging results [27], [28]. BiSECT does
not currently extract any graphical program representations (e.g., AST, CPG, CFG, etc.),
however, it could be extended to do so. Also, Experiment 1, presented in Chapter 4 could
be extended to include the types of vulnerabilities correctly labeled in the hybrid-synthetic
dataset. The experiments could also be redone using real-world code to train and test the
models.
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Additionally, researchers have attempted to develop new code representation models to
recover the reuse of vulnerabilities in functions [146], [254]. We explored the e cacy of
using features extracted by BiSECT directly with existing representation models to achieve
comparable results. Like [146], we used the dataset of vulnerabilities provided by [254].
This dataset contains 108,474 functions (including stubs), associated with 8 vulnerabilities.
Variants for each vulnerability are generated using di erent source code versions, and or,
di erent versions of three popular compilers: CLANG, GCC, and ICC. The goal is to
identify the variants of each vulnerability in the datasets. [146] demonstrated that their
representation model, Asm2Vec, could be used to identify the variants for all vulnerabilities
in the dataset with 100% recall, a FPR of 0, ROC and CROC of 1. We were curious if
BiSECT could be used to identify function level vulnerability reuse. First, we used BiSECT
to create the 5 DII~ =BCAD2C8>= sequences and function level cyclomatic complexity features
for all functions in the dataset. Then, we trained the Doc2Vec and fastText representation
models using the extracted features. Using this workflow we correctly grouped all but one of
the vulnerabilities in the dataset. We plan to continue to refine our technique and the features
extracted by BiSECT to achieve 100% accuracy.
In addition to these opportunities for future work, we have continued to experiment
with additional sentence embedded techniques to identify vulnerabilities in software. The
experiments presented in Chapter 4 were conducted using Doc2Vec and fastText, however
numerous other embedding techniques could be used. For example, our most recent
experiment with Sentence-BERT (SBERT) [255], a state-of-the-art sentence embedding
technique, indicates that it can be trained to achieve metrics comparable to those achieved by
fastText in our best scenario.
5.2.1 Final Thoughts
In this work we did not set out to address the epidemic of software vulnerabilities as a whole.
Rather we sought solutions that could chip away at major challenges stemming from the
existence of software vulnerabilities.
Whether it’s developing a dataset of real-world vulnerabilities in support of BVATT or
creating new features for BiSECT there remains much work to be done.
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